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Papuan independence leader assassinated 
The man who was elected to head the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) set up in 2000, was 
abducted shortly after leaving the base of Kopassus, the army's elite corps in Jayapura, late on 10 
November. The body of Theys Hiyo Eluay, who had become a respected, high-profile community 
figure, was found dead on 11 November, the day after he had been abducted. 
The assassination plunged Papua into a deep political 
crisis. Few people doubt that elements within the 
Indonesian army, almost certainly within Kopassus, are 
responsible for the crime. There have been many calls, in 
Papua as well as from members of the US Congress and 
international human rights organisations, for an indepen-
dent commission to be set up to investigate the crime. Four 
days after the abduction, the European Union expressed 
'deep concern' about the death and called on the Indonesian 
authorities to conduct a full investigation. 
Theys had been invited to dinner at the Kopassus head-
quarters in Hamadi, South Jayapura, the capital city of 
Papua, on the occasion of Indonesian Heroes' Day on 10 
November. Colonel Hartono, commander of the Tribuana 
Kopassus unit had driven to the home of Theys that morn-
ing to escort him to the event. Minutes after leaving the base 
at around 1 Opm for the 45km drive home, his driver phoned 
his wife in a state of great agitation, to tell her that her 
husband had been abducted. The driver, Aristoteles Masuko, 
had apparently been forced out of the car. While they were 
talking, the line was cut and the family's attempts to ring the 
driver on his mobile were unsuccessful. Aris, as the driver is 
known to his friends, has since disappeared. The fact that he 
is the key witness to the crime makes his disappearance all 
the more alarming. 
On the following day, the body of Theys was found by 
villagers in Skouw, not far from the border with Papua New 
Guinea, more than 50 kms from where he had been 
abducted. His car was found upturned on the edge of a 
ravine near a tree, positioned as if to suggest that there had 
been an accident. His face was black and his tongue was 
hanging out, suggesting that he had been strangled to death, 
though the perpetrators had taken every precaution not to 
leave any marks on the body. An autopsy later concluded 
that Theys had died of suffocation. 
Impartial inquiry needed 
Human Rights Watch called for an impartial inquiry into 
what was 'clearly a welL-planned assassination' while 
TAPOL, in a statement two days after the crime, strongly 
condemning this act of state terror called for a special 
commission 'independent of military interference' to estab-
lish the facts of this 'political assassination' . 
Members of the victim's family immediately blamed the 
military, referring to the fact that members of Kopassus 
were well aware of his precise whereabouts. 
While members of Kopassus were quick to profess their 
innocence, the military commander of Trikora military 
commander, Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, defied all 
logic, saying that the PDP chair had 'probably died of a 
heart condition'. Simbolon is himself from Kopassus and 
served for years as military commander in East Timor 
during the mid 1990s and earned himself a reputation for 
great brutality. 
At the time he was killed, Theys Eluay, together with four 
other PDP leaders, was on trial for subversion. The others on 
trial with him were: Thaha Al Hamid, secretary-general of 
the PDP, the Rev. Herman Awom, Don Flossy and John 
Mambor. The trial appears to have been suspended. 
News of the death resulted in some acts of violence in 
his home town of Sentani where angry crowds burnt several 
buildings and blocked the roads. However, apart from these 
outbursts, protests have taken the form of well-organised, 
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peaceful demonstrations. 
Theys was buried on 17 November, in the presence of a 
grief-stricken crowd of over ten thousand people, some of 
whom had trekked long distances. The Papuan kejora 
(Morning Star) flag fluttered half-mast in many places 
throughout Papua. He was buried near his home in Sentani, 
in a sports field which has been transformed into the burial 
place for independence leaders. 
Back in August 1969, Theys was one of more than a 
thousand Papuans who were coerced into becoming 
members of several hand-picked councils that were required 
to adopt a 'unanimous' decision in favour of integration with 
Indonesia. This so-called 'Act of Free Choice' organised by 
the Indonesian military became the basis for a resolution of 
the UN General Assembly on 19 November 1969, removing 
the question of West Papua from the UN agenda. In an inter-
view with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in May 
2001, Theys said: · 
'During those days, especially during the so-called Act of 
Free Choice, I myself for instance, I was taken from my home 
in the middle of the night without my wife and my children 
knowing about it, why I was taken and where I was being taken 
to. When I arrived to where the others were being interned, we 
were all drilled that the province of West lrian, which is what it 
was called at the time, belonged to the Republic of Indonesia, 
was an integral part of the Republic, and we were not allowed 
to say anything else. We had to go along with that, we had to 
give in to the intimidation. ' [Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 31May2001] 
Theys also bore the title of Ondofolo, tribal leader, as 
chief of the Sentani tribe. 
Papuan Presidium Council 
The Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) which Theys 
Eluay chaired was set up at a meeting in Jayapura in 
February 2000 when it was decided to convene the Second 
Papuan Congress in May-June 2000. This Congress was 
held as a sequel to the first Papuan Congress held in 
December 1961 when the territory was still under Dutch 
ru le. On that occasion , Papuan independence was 
proclaimed and national emblems including the flag and 
anthem were adopted. 
The Second Congress was attended by hundreds of dele-
gates with the enthusiastic support of many thousands of 
Papuans who gathered in Jayapura at the time of the event. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin, No 158, June 2000.] While adopting 
a firm position in support of independence for Papua, and 
rejecting the validity of the Act of Free Choice which was 
held in August 1969, the Congress decided to pursue the 
path of dialogue with Jakarta, eschewing violence as a 
means of struggle. Since its foundation, the PDP has 
projected a new image of Papua's independence struggle, 
dedicated to a peaceful solution. The OPM or Free Papua 
Movement which, with its armed wing, the TPN, has waged 
an armed struggle since 1965, still exists as a separate entity 
while having a place within the PDP. 
The then president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
gave his support to the Congress and initially promised to 
deliver the opening address. He later changed his mind, 
apparently under pressure from his vice-president, Megawati 
Sukamoputri, and donated money instead. Wahid later 
showed his sympathy for Theys and the other PDP leaders 
when he urged the police in Jayapura not to keep the five 
men facing charges in custody. The police ignored his pleas. 
Wahid's efforts, aimed at encouraging Papuans to pursue the 
path of dialogue, did not find favour with the armed forces 
or with Megawati Sukarnoputri who later took over as pres-
ident when Wahid was impeached in July 2001. 
" The Papua Presidium Council was soon acknowledged 
as a truly representative body supported by Papuans from 
all walks oflife, with local representatives known as 'panels' 
in all parts o~ the territory. The political impact of the 
Congress and the PDP was not lost on the security forces 
and military intelligence who immediately saw the need for 
an operation to reverse the overwhelming support for inde-
pendence. 
Secret intelligence operation 
Less than a week aft.er the Second Congress, the key 
Indonesian military and non-military intelligence agencies, 
thirteen in all, came together to discuss political develop-
ments in Papua. Alarmed by the fact that 'the social/politi-
cal conditions in Papua following the Papuan Congress has 
become very volatile', they agreed on the need 'to take 
speedy, concrete actions to anticipate ever-growing support 
in Irian Jaya and more generally throughout Indonesia'. The 
record of the meeting, marked 'sangat rahasia' (top secret) 
and dated 8 June 2000, noted that the people of Papua 'right 
down to the villages, were in a state of euphoria over the 
question of Independence, that a conspiracy of those in 
favour of Independence was becoming very solid and that 
efforts were underway to spread the results of the Papuan 
Congress to all corners of the territory, to the whole of 
Indonesia and even to the wider world' . 
[The record of this meeting which was held under the 
auspices of the Ministry of the Interior in Jakarta, was 
leaked to TAPOL earlier this year. A summary was posted 
on the Internet on 12 October 2001. See 'Secret Operation 
in West Papua to Undermine Pro-Independence Movement', 
on www.gn.apc.org/tapol.] 
The intelligence agencies decided to set up a special task 
force to create a 'more conducive' political situation in 
Papua; the strategic target of the task force was identified as 
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Torture Committee slams 'climate of impunity' 
On 22 November, the Geneva-based Committee against Torture strongly criticised Indonesia's 
record on eradicating torture and ill treatment and published a series of recommendations aimed at 
encouraging the Government to address the 'climate of impunity' and other major concerns 
The Committee against Torture - a panel of human 
rights experts which sits at the UN in Geneva - oversees 
States' compliance with the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. Having ratified the Convention in 1998, the 
Indonesian Government, in accordance with its obligations 
under the Convention, submitted its (belated) first periodic 
report for consideration by the Committee in February 
2001. 
Concerns and Recommendations 
While noting a few positive developments, the 
Committee expressed strong criticism of Indonesia's record 
in a long list of concerns. They included a large number of 
allegations of torture and ill treatment committed by the 
police, the police special forces Brimob, the army and 
paramilitary groups, especially in areas of conflict such as 
Aceh, Maluku and Papua, and allegations of excessive use 
of force against demonstrators or during investigations, of 
attacks against human rights defenders, of abuses 
committed by military personnel employed by businesses, 
and of the use of rape and sexual violence as forms of 
torture and ill treatment. 
During the Committee's review of Indonesia's report, 
the Committee's rapporteur on Indonesia, Felice Gaer, 
expressed shock at the number of allegations of torture and 
at the fact that only one or two cases had come to trial. She 
also registered her disapproval of the limited nature of the 
Indonesian Government's report and the lack of attention it 
paid to the practical implementation of the Convention. 
The Committee expressed its concern at the absence in the 
report of disaggregated statistics and other information on 
torture. 
Committee Chair, Peter Bums, professor of law, said 
the situation of Indonesia provided the most stark 
illustration of the difference between formal law and 
practice in relation to torture. 
Addressing the 'climate of impunity', the Committee 
expressed concern at the lack of prompt, impartial and full 
investigations into allegations of torture and at the lack of 
progress in bringing to trial members of the military, police 
and state officials involved in torture and ill treatment, 
particularly those in senior positions. It recommended the 
establishment of an effective, reliable and independent 
complaint system to undertake prompt, impartial and 
effective investigations and to prosecute and punish the 
perpetrators, including senior officials and those involved 
directly or indirectly in paramilitary operations using 
torture. 
The Committee also expressed concern about the lack 
of independence and impartiality of the National 
Commission on Human Rights (Komnas-HAM), about the 
fact that Komnas-HAM reports are not published in full 
and about Komnas HAM's inability to challenge decisions 
by the Attorney General not to prosecute a case as 
recommended by the Commission. It recommended 
immediate measures to address these issues. 
On the question of torture and other serious crimes 
committed in East Timor, the Committee expressed 
concern at the limited mandate of the proposed ad hoc 
human rights courts on East Timor, about the problems 
associated with the non-retroactivity principle introduced 
into the Indonesian Constitution and about Indonesia's 
inadequate co-operation with the serious crimes unit of 
UNT AET [see separate article on Justice]. It recommended 
extension of the jurisdiction of the ad hoc court, steps to 
ensure that torture and crimes against humanity committed 
in the past can be prosecuted, and full co-operation with 
UNTAET, including the transfer of suspects for trials in 
East Timor. 
While it noted the formal separation of the police from 
the military as a positive development, the Committee 
expressed concern that the police continued to be 
asso.ciated with allegations of torture and recommended 
continued reforms to strengthen the police as an 
independent civilian law enforcement agency. 
The Committee noted the lack of response to 
communications sent by the UN special rapporteur on 
torture. It recommended that Indonesia should respond to a 
request dating back to 1993 and invite the special 
rapporteur to visit the country. 
Other issues dealt with by the Committee included the 
need to amend Indonesian criminal law so that torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
are strictly prohibited and that the penalties reflect the 
seriousness of the crime, the need to reduce the length of 
pre-trial detention and ensure access to legal counsel, 
relatives and medical assistance, the need to protect victims 
and witnesses and to exclude in any proceedings any 
statement made under torture, the need to ensure that no 
person can be removed to another State where that person 
is in danger of torture, the need to ensure protection for 
human rights defenders, the need to reinforce education 
and training for law-enforcement officials, judges and 
medical personnel and the need to provide rehabilitation for 
the victims of torture and ill-treatment. 
Positive aspects noted by the Committee included a 
recognition by the Government that the eradication of 
torture is linked to overcoming a culture of violence within 
the army and police, the acknowledgement of a pressing 
need for a centralised register of detainees and interest 
expressed in the government co-operating with national 
NGOs in monitoring prisons and places of detention. 
The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Torture 
Committee in full are available on the website of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights at: 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)ICAT.C.XXVII.Con 
cl.3.En ?Opendocument 
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T APOL attended the Committee sessions on Indonesia 
at the invitation of the World Organisation Against Torture 
(OMCT). A copy of the OMCT report to the Committee, 
prepared in collaboration with TAPOL, is also available on 
request. An alternative Indonesian NGO coalition report is 
also available on request. 
Torture of Bandung prisoners 
The gravity of the situation of torture in Indonesia was 
underlined just a few days after the meeting of the Torture 
Committee with the publication on 29 November 2001 of a 
report by the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 
on torture and other human rights violations suffered by 19 
activists in Bandung, Central Java. 
The activists were arrested on 14 June 2001 during a 
protest against an increase in the price of fuels. They were 
charged with displaying signs that may cause humiliation 
to public authorities under Article 160 of the Penal Code 
and using violence against people or goods under Article 
170 of the Penal Code. AHRC interviewed nine of the 19 
defendants and attended the trials of ten of them. The 
report reveals clear evidence of torture and ill-treatment by 
the police for the purposes of punishment, intimidation and 
obtaining confessions. Much of the police interrogation 
was apparently aimed at gathering intelligence information 
about the defendants' political activities and was unrelated 
to the charges against them. 
The acts of torture included: beatings with fists ; striking 
with weapons including guns, teargas ·guns, and bamboo 
poles; severe kicking, including to the head, groin, 
abdomen and sternum; stabbing with bayonets; burning 
with lighted cigarettes; denial of medical attention; and 
stitching without anaesthetics. 
The injuries suffered included concussion and loss of 
consciousness; deep wounds and gashes, profuse bleeding, 
severe bruising, hearing loss, back injuries, headaches, and 
burns. 
The authorities failed to investigate the allegations of 
torture or to exclude confessions made under torture from 
the proceedings against the defendants. The defendants 
also suffered other violations, such as incommunicado 
detention, and denial of their rights to legal assistance, to 
be tried without undue delay and to a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. 
A copy of the full AHRC report is available at 
www.ahrck.net 
TAPOL calls for cancellation of plans for new 
Aceh military command 
The following is the text of a letter sent by TAPOL on 17 January 2002 to British Foreign Office 
Minister, Ben Bradshaw, calling on Britain to press the Indonesian Government to cancel plans for 
a new military command in Aceh and to order the military commander to rescind a recently-issued 
'shoot-on-sight' order. 
"Dear Mr Bradshaw, 
"The Indonesian armed forces earlier this week 
announced that they would go ahead with a decision to 
create a military command in Aceh despite protests from a 
large number of civil society organisations in Aceh. These 
organisations pointed out that the establishment of this 
military command would further intensify the level of 
military operations in the territory. When the idea of setting 
up a military command in Aceh was first mooted in 
Jakarta, the Bukit Barisan military commander said that the 
views of the Acehnese people would be considered but it 
appears that the only voice in favour was that of the 
provincial governor, Mr Abdullah Puteh, and one or two 
members of the local assembly. All other views have been 
ignored. 
"Human rights organisations and activists in Jakarta 
today called for the cancellation of the decision to set up 
the military command, warning that this could only further 
aggravate the level of human rights abuses in Aceh. 
"Matters have been made even worse by a 'shoot-to-
kill' order issued on Monday by Brig.General Djali Yusuf, 
commander of military operations in Aceh. He was quoted 
in Tuesday's Jakarta Post as saying: 'I have ordered all 
security officers to shoot on sight those found intentionally 
disturbing public order or peace.' This is a grave threat to 
the safety of anyone deemed by the military to be acting 
against their wishes. The threat is particularly ominous at 
present when Aceh is in the throes of a general strike to 
protest against the establishment of the military command. 
"The situation in Aceh continues to deteriorate by the 
day. In the first three weeks of 2002, scores of people have 
already been killed. The government has effectively 
suspended peace talks with GAM. The Indonesian 
authorities are defying all logic by pursuing the path of 
military operations and continue to ignore pleas to halt 
human rights abuses and bring those responsible for past 
and present abuses to justice. 
"TAPOL calls upon the British Government: 
1. To press the Indonesian Government and military to 
cancel plans to create a military command in Aceh. 
2. To call on the Indonesian authorities to order the 
commander of military operations in Aceh to rescind 
his 'shoot-on-sight' order, which is nothing short of a 
criminal act. 
3. To press the Indonesian authorities to start the process 
of bringing to justice all those responsible for human 
rights abuses in Aceh, dating back to 1989 when DOM 
was first introduced. 
"We also urge you to raise these matters with Britain's 
partners in the EU. 
"Yours sincerely etc." 
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'community leaders, religious leaders, traditional leaders, 
youth and student leaders and the local media'. The docu-
ment identifies by name a number of targeted persons, 
including Theys Hiyo Eluay and other PDP leaders, Tom 
Beanal, church figures such as the Rev Herman Awom and 
Karel Phil Erari, academics Dr Benny Giay and Agus Alua, 
Jakobus Pervidya Salossa (who is now governor of Papua), 
John Rumbiak and Yohanis Bonay of ELS HAM, the human 
rights NGO and student leaders Gerson Abrauw and Diaz 
Giwijangge. 
As well as being the chair of the PDP, Theys Eluay was 
also one of Papua's foremost tribal leaders, so he was a 
'strategic target' on two counts. Since his death, other lead-
ing PDP figures have complained ofreoeiving life-threaten-
ing phone calls and believe that their lives too are in danger. 
'Peace remains our method' 
Tom Beanal, deputy chair of the PDP, has told the press 
that he holds Kopassus responsible for the death of Theys. 
Beanal is leader of the Amungme tribe, whose ancestral 
lands were seized and ravaged by the Freeport/McMoRan 
copper and gold mine. Beanal has since taken the contro-
versial decision to accept a position on the board of 
commissioners of the company. 
In an interview with the Indonesian-language weekly, 
TEMPO, on 2 December, Beanal talked at length about the 
killing ofTheys and the consequences for the PDP. 'According 
to our custom, if someone invites a person for a meal, they 
must take responsibility for what happens after they leave to 
return home.' He said that the killing of Theys was clearly a 
'very professional job'. Theys' driver said when he phoned 
Theys' wife that the men who abducted Theys were 'orang 
amber', (non-Papuans) and he could not believe that 
Indonesian government employees, traders or transmigrants 
could have committed such a well-planned crime. 
He said the Megawati government must ensure that the 
crime is properly investigated. 'If this doesn't happen, we will 
conclude that the government will go ahead and kill us all. We 
won't ask the government to come here anymore and we'll tell 
them we can stand alone. That will be the result.' 
On 20 October, the PDP issued a statement strongly reject-
ing the 'special autonomy' law for Papua that was about to be 
adopted by the Indonesian parliament, saying that they had 
never been consulted on the matter and their pleas for dialogue 
about Papua's future status had been ignored. 
The PDP leadership have stated that they will not proceed 
to elect a new chairperson until the investigations into Theys's 
death have reached a satisfactory conclusion. In the early days 
of the Papuan Presidium Council, Theys Hiyo Eluay was joint 
chair together with Ton Beanal. 
Evidence piles up 
Initial investigations by the local police force have 
produced a great deal of evidence about the abduction of the 
PDP leader. However, they have made no secret of the fact that 
their investigations have come up against 'a blank wall'. This 
alludes to the fact that while the police have powers to under-
take a criminal investigation, they are prevented from investi-
gating members of the armed forces who are covered by a 
separate, military code of laws. 
Among the more than forty witnesses questioned by the 
police are six men who were travelling in a mini-cab close to 
the place where Theys's car was ambushed. They told the 
police that they came across Aris, Theys's driver, in great 
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distress, with blood on his face. He asked the driver of the cab 
to give him a lift to the nearby Kopassus base. The driver did 
as he asked and left him just a few metres from the entrance to 
the base, as he was afraid to go any nearer. They left the loca-
tion as Aris enter the base. Some people have asked why Aris 
would have wanted to return to the base. He may have thought 
that the commander, having just hosted his employer, would 
take action to find out what had happened to his guest, as 
required by Papuan tradition. 
ELSHAM's investigations 
Papua's leading human rights organisation ELSHAM, the 
Papuans amidst BR/MOB, elite Police forces 
Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, issued a 
Preliminary Report on 13 December, on the abduction and 
assassination which they described as being 'a pre-meditated 
and politically-motivated crime'. 
The starting point for its analysis was the secret operations 
planned by thirteen intelligence agencies only days after the 
Papuan Congress was held in May-June 2000 (see above). 
ELSHAM drew a connection between this operation discussed 
at a meeting on 8 June 2000 and the sudden visit to Papua 
shortly beforehand by Megawati Sukarnoputri, then the vice-
president. Her assessment of the situation in Papua was 
contained in a report to the caretaker governor of Papua who 
reported this to his bosses at the Ministry of the Interior, under 
whose aegis the secret operation meeting was held. ELSHAM 
accuses Megawati of having contributed to the subsequent loss 
of Papuan lives, culminating in the assassination of Theys 
Eluay. 
ELSHAM investigators also discovered that the security 
forces created an atmosphere of fear in the days prior to the 
assassination. In one location, a virtual night curfew was 
imposed, warning people, especially young men, not to go out 
of doors at night in and around Jayapura. In late October, 
Kopassus troops also imposed a night curfew in Koya Timur, 
Tengah and Barat, close to the border with Papua New Guinea, 
until 'security conditions improved'. Joint patrols had effec-
tively isolated the area. It was here that the body of Theys 
Eluay was found on 11 November. 
On the morning of 10 November, two non-Papuan men 
describing themselves as 'intel', visited the Koya area, saying 
that they were looking for members of a Papuan taskforce. 
Later that night, a villager from Skouw (where Theys's body 
was found the next day) was roughly stopped by three 
Kopassus soldiers from going on an all-night hunting expedi-
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tion. The villager returned home, but later told ELSHAM 
investigators that he felt something strange had been going on. 
The ELSHAM report gives a detailed description of the 
many security posts located on the road along which the abduc-
tors would have had to drive the vehicle with Theys inside. An 
accompanying map shows the area, close to the border with 
PNG, to be heavily militarised. At at least three of the posts it 
is normal practice for non-military vehicles to be stopped for 
identification of the passengers. 
Witnesses questioned by the ELSHAM team said they saw 
the vehicle in which Theys was being driven home being 
forced to stop by another vehicle that cut across in front. They 
saw two hefty non-Papuans alight from the vehicle and pull 
open the door of Theys's car. They had difficulty pulling out 
the driver because he was gripping the steering-wheel so 
tightly. After gaining control of the wheel, the abductors drove 
the car a short distance with the driver, Aris, hanging half out 
of the door. When he was pushed out, the witnesses who were 
in a mini truck recognised him as Theys's driver, with blood 
coming from his mouth. They took him on board and then at 
his request, drove him to the Kopassus base where Theys had 
had dinner. 
Another witness who had been helping to receive the guests 
at the Kopassus base told the ELSHAM team that as he was 
cleaning the area where the guests had been received, he saw a 
man enter the base. The man was crying and saying: 'If 
anything happens, I will be blamed by Ibu (a reference to 
Theys's wife whom he would address with this word, meaning 
'mother'). The car is lost. How could this have happened?' As 
he was speaking, the man was grabbed by two Kopassus 
soldiers and taken into the sleeping quarters. This was Aris, the 
driver. However, according to later reports, Kopassus soldiers 
strongly denied that Aris returned to the base and deny having 
any knowledge of his whereabouts. 
ELSHAM also drew attention to the dangers faced by 
witnesses and the need for witness protection. The local police 
chief, also acutely aware of this problem, even asked ELSHAM 
to help protect the witnesses. 
[The English translation of ELSHAM's Preliminary 
Reports is available on TAPOL's website.} 
Independent commission essential 
Within days, calls were reverberating for the assassination 
to be investigated by an independent commission. The most 
powerful message came from the leaders of the Protestant and 
Catholic churches and of the Muslim Council, in a letter to 
Kornnas HAM, the National Human Rights Commission. They 
declared that with the abduction and murder of the chair of the 
PDP, people's confidence in the government had fallen to an 
all-time low. People doubted whether 'the truth could be 
revealed if investigations were left to the police and/or the mili-
tary police.' The religious leaders said that people who had 
come forward as witnesses were in fear for their lives because 
they had been receiving threats. They appealed to Kornnas 
HAM to set up an independent commission composed of 
persons with the necessary expertise and of integrity and 
stressed that members of the police and the army should be 
excluded. 
Kopassus involvement undeniable 
Since the start of the investigations, most people in 
Jayapura, including the police investigators, have come to the 
conclusion that officers at the Kopassus Tribuana base were 
involved in the killing. The police made no secret of the fact 
that they had questioned seven Kopassus officers but also 
expressed frustration that their limited powers had confronted 
them with a 'blank wall'. Even the army chief of staff, General 
Endiartono Sutarto, while denying that orders to kill Theys 
had been given, admitted that 'rogue elements' might have 
been involved. 
Following a visit to Papua by three members of Komnas 
HAM, the National Human Rights Commission, all of whom 
are known to have strong military connections, the 
Commission in Jakarta announced it would be pressing for the 
creation of an 'independent' commission, composed among 
others of personnel from the military, the police and the mili-
tary police. 
After a meeting with members of Kornnas HAM, the 
central government then waded in with an announcement in 
mid December that it would set up an 'independent commis-
sion' by the end of the year. Minister-coordinator for security 
affairs, the retired general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, said 
the commission would include figures from the government 
and the security forces and NGOs, and even suggested that an 
expert from overseas might be invited to join. 
By the of the year and well into January, nothing had been 
heard of this 'independent commission'. Instead, the army 
announced that it was sending its own team to Jayapura to 
investigate the crime. This can only mean that news of 
Kopassus involvement had forced the army to take the matter 
over and deal with it in their own way. Meanwhile, Indonesia's 
new chief of police, Da'i Bachtiar came out with a stunning 
admission on 29 December that evidence so far collected 
'points to members of Kopassus based in the Tribuana 
Kopassus base being responsible for the crime' . [Cendrawasih 
Pos, 30 December 2002] As the police were unable to investi-
gate members of Kopassus, it was now for the military police 
to become involved, he said. According to the Jayapura police 
chief, Drs Made Mangku Pastika, this would mean that the role 
of the police in investigating the crime would end. Halfway 
through January, the police chief announced that their investi-
gations had indeed 'reached a dead end' and they would now 
wait for the government's team to be set up. But he had no idea 
when this would be. [Jakarta Post online, 12 January 2002] 
If, as now seems to be the case, the crime has become a 
matter for the army, this can only mean that the army will seek 
to handle the investigations and any possible indictment 
strictly within the limits of the army's own judicial mecha-
nisms. This will block any investigation into the mastermind-
ing and planning of the assassination, and limit it to putting one 
or two 'oknum' (rogue elements) in the dock. 
As all these machinations were underway, the three leading 
human rights organisations in Papua, ELSHAM, the LBH 
(Legal Aid Institute) and Kontras (Commission for the 
Disappeared and the Victims of Violence) stated their strong 
opposition to moves by the government and the imilitary to 
investigate the assassination themselves. This would mean 
'localising' the crime and treating it as an 'ordinary crime' 
instead of an extraordinary crime involving state institutions. 
They reiterated their conviction that the killing was politically 
motivated and could only be handled by an independent inter-
national team which should include major, world human rights 
NGOs. The team should also have powers to investigate the 
role of state institutions, including the President, the Supreme 
Congress, the parliament (DPR), the Interior Minister and the 
national intelligence agencies. * 
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Can 'special autonomy' work? 
Confronting by growing resistance to rule from Jakarta in Aceh and Papua, the Indonesian 
government is trying to mollify the people in these two territories by offering them 'special auton-
omy'. This is intended as a strategy to prevent the country's disintegration and to preserve NKRI, 
the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. But can it work? 
During 2001, the DPR, the Indonesian parliament, 
adopted two laws on special autonomy for Aceh and 
Papua. Under these laws, Aceh is now called Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalem or NAD for short, while Papua will 
shortly become the official name for what was formerly 
Irian Jaya. These laws were adopted as an additional 
Indonesian military in operation in Aceh 
incentive for the two 'troublesome' territories, only months 
after the law on regional autonomy, applicable to the whole 
country, was brought into force. 
However, the problem is that the laws are being offered 
while there is no end in sight to the flagrant human rights 
abuses in both provinces, while military operations are still 
being conducted and demands for accountability for past 
human rights violations continue to be ignored. 
Way forward or dead end? 
The process by which the special autonomy law for Papua 
was drafted is instructive. It shows how genuine efforts were 
made in Papua to draft a law that would take on board 
Papuan demands, but this draft was then drastically 
amended by parliament in Jakarta. 
Yet regardless of these efforts, the very concept of 'auton-
omy' is unacceptable to most Papuans who continue to feel 
aggrieved that their right to self-determination was sabo-
taged in 1969 by a so-called Act of Free Choice conducted 
under tight military control, with the results being shame-
lessly accepted by the United Nations. Against such a back-
ground, it soon became clear that any move towards 'special 
autonomy' would be doomed to fail, and would only inten-
sify calls on the government to acknowledge the need for 
dialogue with people's representatives on the question of 
Papua's status as a part of the Republic of Indonesia. On 20 
October, two days before parliament in Jakarta voted on the 
special autonomy law for Papua, the Papuan Presidium 
Council (PDP) issued a statement rejecting the law and 
repeating its call for dialogue. This statement was signed 
among others by the PDP chairperson, Theys Hiyo Eluay, 
who was assassinated three weeks later. 
The Justice and Peace Secretariat of the Diocese of 
Jayapura has published an account and analysis of this 
process on which the following is based. 
When the idea of autonomy for Papua was first mooted 
by Jakarta, the reasoning was twofold: that the problems in 
Papua were primarily economic, the failure of the develop-
ment policy, and that Papua would for ever remain part of 
the Republic. The Province of Papua as it will now be called 
will be given a much greater share of the proceeds raised 
from the exploitation of its abundant natural resources. 
As the regional assembly, the DPRD, offered no sugges-
tions in response to the proposal being made by Jakarta, it 
was the governor, Jaap Salossa, who took the initiative, 
inviting scholars from Cendrawasih University (UNCEN) 
along with church leaders and NGOs to form a commission 
to draft a law. The process included visits to the districts to 
invite opinions from local communities. 
The visits were disappointing as in many places, they only 
met civil servants. The final consultation took place at a 
three-day conference in late March in Jayapura attended by 
28 delegates from each district but on the opening day, 
hundreds of protesters gathered outside. During the first 
session, students pushed their way in and expressed views 
that were opposed to autonomy. Outside, the police fired 
warning shots; one protester was trampled in the resulting 
clash and died the following day. Meanwhile, the students 
inside invited those who agreed with them to join them in a 
walk-out. A third of the delegates did so and boycotted the 
rest of the conference. 
The Justice and Peace Secretariat concluded that although 
the UNCEN team had tried to incorporate many of the 
people's aspirations into their draft, far too little had been 
done to socialise the draft and it was rejected out of hand 
because the very concept of 'autonomy' had become so 
unpopular. 
Later in the year, when the law was being discussed by the 
DPR, members of the drafting commission went to Jakarta 
and lobbied hard to defend their formulations, but on criti-
cally important matters, they were overruled. 
The drafts compared 
Space permits us to focus on only a few of the many 
issues where the law adopted by the DPR differs signifi-
cantly from the UNCEN draft. These relate to the deploy-
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ment of the security forces, authority over the police, human 
rights and a reconsideration of Papua's history, particular 
with regard to its integration into the Republic oflndonesia. 
While the UNCEN draft stated simply that the Province of 
Papua is granted 'special autonomy', the DPR Law adds the 
words 'within the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia'. 
The UNCEN draft acknowledged that Papua would have 
its own flag, anthem and emblem as symbols of identity, but 
the Law, while allowing these special features, describes 
them as 'cultural symbols' adding that they 'may not be used 
as symbols of sovereignty'. 
With regard to the deployment of the security forces, the 
UNCEN draft provided for a 'participating role for the 
provincial parliament and government', but the Law reduces 
this to 'coordination' between the governor and the central 
government'. 
The UNCEN draft provided for a Papua-based 
Commission on Human Rights set up at provincial level, but 
the Law stipulates that this Commission will be a 'branch' of 
the National (ie Indonesian) Human Rights Commission, 
set up by the central government 
While the UNCEN draft stipulated that compensation 
should be paid to victims of past human rights violations 
(going back to May 1963 when Indonesia took over from 
the UN temporary administration), this is altogether omitted 
in the Law. 
The UNCEN draft's article provided for the setting up of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission under the authority 
of the government of Papua with the task of reaching an 
understanding on the 'history of Papua's integration within 
Indonesia' (thus opening up the question of the fraudulent 
1969 Act of Free Choice) but the Law states that the 
Commission will 'strengthen national unity within the 
Unitary State of the Republic oflndonesia'. 
The UNCEN draft contained an article stating that if the 
Commission (described as a Commission for the 
Rectification of History) 'shows that the process of Papua's 
integration into the Republic of Indonesia did not accord 
with international Jaw in relation to exercising the right to 
self-determination, the central government and the Papuan 
people via their parliament will take steps towards a solu-
tion'. This is omitted in the Law. . 
The UNCEN draft provided for a police force to be set up 
under the regional authority, but the Law states that the 
provincial police force is part of the Indonesian Police 
Force. · 
The DPR Law stipulates that the Province of Papua shall 
receive 80 per cent of revenues from forestry, fisheries and 
mining, and 70 per cent from oil and gas exploration. The 
UNCEN draft said simply that revenues from resource 
exploitation would go to Papua without setting percentages. 
With regard to the processing of Papuan raw materials, the 
UNCEN draft said that this should be done in Papua, while 
the DPR Law states that processing will be determined 
according to 'sound, efficient and competitive principles'. 
The UNCEN draft provided for a halt to transmigration, 
the programme under which tens of thousands of 
Indonesian families are re-settled in Papua, but the Law 
provides for the continuation of transmigration 'in consulta-
tion with the governor'. 
The Special Autonomy Law as adopted by the DPR is due 
to go into force at the beginning of 2002 but there was 
confusion over whether it would come into force as planned, 
following the cancellation of a visit to Papua by President 
Megawati, during which she was due to ceremoniously hand 
over the Law. 
Fatal consequences . 
Some people see the assassination of the PDP chatrper-
son Theys Eluay as having been motivated in part by a 
desire to thwart the introduction of special autonomy. The 
security forces in Papua are known to be unhappy about 
special autonomy even as drafted by Jakarta. In particular, 
the army is known to be strongly opposed to the decision to 
allow Papuans to have their own flag, even just as a cultural 
symbol, and dislikes the idea of any concessions being 
made to the Papuan people. 
Many demonstrations took place in Papua in the wake of 
the Theys' assassination, calling for an independent investi-
gation but also rejecting Jakarta's special autonomy law. 
President Megawati was scheduled to visit Jayapura on 22 
December for two days, to hand over the new Law and to 
spend Christmas there, but at the last minute, the visit was 
cancelled. No explanation was given for the cancellation 
nor was there any hint that the visit might take place at a 
later date. The head of state had obviously been warned by 
her advisers to stay away. 
Sharia law for Aceh 
At the commencement of the new year, it was announced 
that under the special autonomy law for Aceh, now called 
NAD, Islamic Sharia Law was going to be introduced. 
According to reports from Jakarta, the central government 
hoped this would 'dampen down calls for separation in the 
staunchly Muslim region'. It was also said that this was the 
first time 'in overwhelmingly Muslim Indonesia that the 
government had granted a province the right to practice 
Sharia'. [AP, 2 January 2002} 
However, there was little enthusiasm in Aceh for this 
gesture. Yusuf Ismail Pase, a human rights lawyer, said it 
would not solve Aceh's problems. 'The Acehnese have been 
Muslims for generations. They have no need for Sharia.' 
Prosecuting members of the security forces for atrocities in 
Aceh would be a better way to win the hearts of the popula-
tion, he said. As for GAM, the armed resistance movement, 
Tungku Agam Kateraja, a spokesman said: 'We are not 
fighting for an Islamic state but for one free from 
Indonesian rule.' 
Perhaps even more indicative of the Acehnese response is 
the fact that HUDA, the Religious Scholars' Association 
which represents the head teachers and proprietors of about 
600 religious schools in Aceh, with 80,000 students, has 
categorically rejected the law offered by Jakarta. 
The idea of granting Aceh the right to introduce Sharia 
Law was first mooted by Abdurrahman Wahid shortly after 
he became president of Indonesia in late 1999. Having 
initially supported calls in Aceh for a referendum, he re-
positioned himself after meeting with opposition from the 
political elite and came up with the idea of Sharia Law for 
Aceh. In those days, there was little enthusiasm for the idea 
and nothing has changed in the intervening twelve months.* 
6 TAPOL Bulletin No.164/165, December 2001/February 2002 
ECONOMY 
An economy in tatters 
If the Indonesian state were a corporation, it would have been declared bankrupt a few years ago. 
As the crisis enters its fifth year, the fundamentals of the Indonesian economy have gone from bad 
to worse. In a frank address to the MPR, the People's Congress, in early November, President 
M egawati admitted that the crisis had reached a point where the government was unable to provide 
basic services to the people. The economic and political collapse of Argentina hangs like the Sword 
of Damocles over Indonesia. 
There are many similarities with Argentina. Both have 
behaved like obedient clients of the IMF and World Bank. 
Argentina has privatised virtually its entire public sector, 
Indonesia is following suit and is busy dismantling many 
public companies. Both countries also became mega-
borrowers and government debts rose to well over US$100 
billion. Despite IMF and World Bank 'remedies' the crisis 
continued without respite. None of their recipes have 
worked; on the contrary, the patients have no option but to 
default on their debts. Indonesia and Argentina possess the 
same fundamentals: a huge debt, a bankrupt financial 
system, soaring unemployment rate and spreading poverty. 
Even before the tragic 11 September events, both domes-
tic and foreign investments in Indonesia had virtually come 
to a halt because the country was perceived to be so unsta-
ble. The fragility of the situation incurred grave economic, 
political and security risks. Since 1997 the influx of capital 
has been negative. According to one conservative estimate, 
capital flight since 1997 has amounted to US$80 billion, 
while others put the outflow at at least US$100 billion, 
including US$30 billion owned by Indonesian Chinese 
entrepreneurs. As long as the political and security uncer-
tainty continues, large sums will remain 'parked' in places 
like Singapore and Hong Kong. 
US$200 billion debt 
After 1997, Indonesia had joined the top five in the league 
of highly indebted countries. As in Argentina, Peru, Brazil 
and Turkey, the crisis in these 'debt trap' countries, despite 
religiously following the IMF's stringent conditions, contin-
ued to worsen. Indonesia's foreign debt is around US$140 
billion (state debt US$75 and private debt US$65 billion). 
This foreign debt is roughly equal to Indonesia's Gross 
National Product and means that Indonesia has to pay 
between US$8 and $9 billion in interest annually. 
The state's domestic debts have also grown massively. 
When the banking system collapsed in 1997, the IMF urged 
the central bank, Bank Indonesia to rescue and re-capitalise 
the banks. The blanket guarantee meant that the private 
debts were taken over by the government. A total ofRp 674 
trillion or around US$65 billion in the form of government 
bonds was issued by Bank Indonesia. In exchange, the 
banks had to provide IOUs and all their assets to a newly 
created body called IBRA (Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency). The system of paying debts by assuming even 
more debts through the issue of bonds on a large scale has 
kept rate of the rupiah low and brought about double-digit 
inflation. A conservative estimate of the government 
domestic debt is US$200 billion. Some government bonds 
issued in 1998 have reached maturity, thus adding to the 
burden on the budget. 
In the 2002 state budget, interest payments ofRp59.6 tril-
lion (government bonds) and Rp27.4 trillion in foreign loan 
interests were included under routine expenditure, meaning 
that 44.6 per cent of routine expenditure is currently being 
swallowed up to repay debts while 30.5 per cent is used to 
pay the interest on government bonds. This leaves almost 
nothing for items like development projects or paying the 
wages of civil servants. It is obvious that rescheduling the 
debts is not an option. 
Indonesia in the Year 2001 seen by Jakarta Post cartoon-
ist T. Sutanto 
Outstanding 'non-performing loan' (a euphemism for 
loans that cannot be repaid) in Asia has reached US$2,000 
billion. Here too Indonesia heads the league. According to 
Ernst & Young, a professional services firm, 60 per cent of 
the outstanding loans of the Indonesian banks are non-
performing. Rescheduling debts is increasingly becoming 
an illusion. Debt default is becoming much more realistic. 
The bubble bursts 
The economic model of the East Asian economies, geared 
to neo-liberal principles, reached its peak in the eighties. Its 
proponents, first and foremost the IMF and the World Bank, 
propagated this model which meant basically an export-
oriented economy based on cheap manufacturing products 
for the world market, privatisation of the state-owned sector, 
high foreign investments and high national savings. 
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After the crash in Bangkok in 1997, it became clear that 
this neo-liberal model was fundamentally flawed. Already 
in the early nineties, when the Japanese economy began its 
slide into a deep slump, the easy credit flow into East Asian 
economies like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand had 
started to show signs of bubble economies that were about 
to burst. Huge investments were thrown into non-viable 
projects. The best example is the massive energy projects 
started in the final days of the Suharto era. The state elec-
tricity company PLN was ordered by Suharto to sign 
monopoly energy projects with 27 foreign energy corpora-
tions. PLN was forced to agree to buy electricity for a price 
twice as high as world market prices. These billion-dollar 
projects obliged Indonesia to a commitment of a total of 
US$133 billion. 
When the bubble finally burst, corporations and govern-
ments, often linked together through Suharto and his 
Hapus Utanu luar Neueri,. 
Tolak Globalisasi Ekonomi ... ! 
JANGAN MAU JADI 
Anti-debt campaign poster, opposing economic 
globalisation and mounting debts 
cronies, were dragged down simultaneously. Re-negotiation 
of these mega-projects is still underway. 
At the peak of the economic upsurge in the late eighties, 
the Indonesian government followed the IMF/World Bank 
advice to liberalise the economy, which led to a mushroom-
ing banking system. More than 200 banks were established 
in that period and all joined the get-rich-quick game 
through lending and speculation. Although it is nearly five 
years since the collapse of the banking system, the 
Indonesian government and the Bank Indonesia have made 
virtually no progress towards restructuring the banking 
system, which means that the banks are still unable to 
perform their primary duty as financial intermediaries. 
The continuing crisis in the banking system is the result of 
the failure of IBRA. This body was set up immediately after 
the crisis to invigorate the banking system and revitalise the 
corporations through privatisation. All the ailing banks and 
corporations were placed under the IBRA. In the?ry IBRA 
was supposed to sell the juicy parts of the corporations to the 
private sector while re-capitalising the banks; the proceeds 
of IBRA would be used to cover the budget deficit. But 
IBRA has achieved none of its targets and has instead 
become a nesting ground for corruption for the old and new 
elite of the post-Suharto era. These so-called 'slaughter 
houses' strip off the juicy parts of the corporations, while the 
assets are pocketed by the elite. Corruption in the post-
Suharto era has spread in all directions as the old vertical 
structure fractured into many factions. !BRA is also 
conducting a cheap sale of state corporations, one of the 
demands of the IMF, but global corporations continue to 
adopt a 'wait-and-see' attitude, preferring to wait for politi-
cal conditions in Indonesia to improve. 
Social economic impact . . 
Meanwhile social conditions have detenorated drastically. 
The latest World Bank figures note that 60 per cent of the 
population now live around or under the poverty line of 
below US$2 per day. Labour-intensive manufacturing 
industry, an important component in the export-oriented 
economy of Indonesia, is in a bad shape with a drop in 
exports of between 20 to 40 per cent being predicted. 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Jacob Nuwa 
Wea recently admitted that the government is running out of 
ideas to create jobs for the three million new job seekers 
annually and the 40 million already jobless. He admitted 
that the government has no new strategies to tackle unem-
ployment which rose to an astronomical 40 million people 
this year, apart from 'sending more maids overseas' and 
explore domestic job opportunities like agro-industry, fish-
ery and tourism. 
The official figure for Indonesians working abroad is 
460,000, in countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi 
Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries but this figure 
understates the situation. Due to their low skills and lack of 
foreign languages, they often end up working as domestic 
servants, often the prey of sexual and physical abuse. This 
official figure is very conservative. In Malaysia alone, the 
number of illegal migrants is above one million. Industries 
in Japan and Hong Kong have also absorbed an unknown 
number of illegal Indonesian workers. 
Neo-liberal proponents still believe in this economic 
model, despite its disastrous impact on the lives of the 
common people. 
Declaring countries bankrupt 
Numerous books were written about the wonders of the 
Japanese economy, the East Asia miracle and the infallabil-
ity of the global free market but since 1997 the tide has 
turned and many of those books are gathering dust on the 
bookshelves. 
The negative side of globalisation has become more glar-
ingly obvious in the last few years. Multilateral organisa-
tions like the IMF and the World Bank have become the 
focus of criticism not only from anti-globalisation 
campaigners but increasingly also from pro-active free 
marketeers. 
The implosion of Argentina carries IMF's fingerprints all 
over it, said Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for 
Economic and Policy Review in Washington. The IMF 
arranged huge loans - including US$40 billion in 1990 - to 
support the peso. The fixed exchange rate of the peso to the 
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dollar led to exorbitant interest rates that crippled the 
Argentine economy. IMF arm-twisted Argentina by making 
the loans conditional on a 'zero-deficit' policy, forcing a 
balanced budget during a period of serious recession. The 
Argentine budget was modest by any calculation and 
squeezing it further created a huge political crisis and the 
collapse of the De la Rua government. 
It has become more than clear that the IMF recipe for 
ailing countries simply doesn't function. On the contrary, as 
more countries are hit by mega financial crises, IMF bail-
outs have proven to be increasingly ineffective. The magni-
tude of the economic difficulties plaguing some countries 
defies the assumptions and solutions found in any economic 
text-book or IMF guideline. 
The Krueger plan 
The economic collapse of Argentina has intensified the 
discussion about what kind of measures are left to deal with 
a financial crisis of such a magnitude. The global recession 
is a fact oflife and the three main players: the US, Japan and 
Germany are definitely part of the crisis. In November Anne 
Krueger, the IMF's first deputy managing director 
announced the IMF management's backing for a radical 
plan for a new procedure for international bankruptcy. This 
would give the IMF the power to impose temporary stand-
stills on debt payments while the ailing countries work out 
restructuring deals with their creditors. 
If one looks at the Argentine debt default, it is clear that 
this radical plan didn't fall from the sky. Everything in their 
box of tricks has failed to heal the patient. The ineffective-
ness of the IMF and the financial policy of the US, its lead-
ing shareholder, have come glaringly obvious. 
Latin American governments have loudly criticised 
Washington for bungling its dealings with Argentina by 
adopting inconsistent policies. Argentina's implosion, the 
first basket case, is likely to be followed by other ailing 
countries like Indonesia, who are also rapidly sliding into 
default of their debts. 
The radical Krueger scheme has faced opposition from 
private sector bondholders, fearing that their debts will 
never be repaid. But the plan has many supporters who 
realise that fundamental reform of the global financial 
system is urgently needed. There are no international instru-
ments available on how to restructure or write off sovereign 
or government debts. The Krueger plan or a modification is 
bound to happen, sooner rather than later. 
Rampant corruption 
Whi1e the IMF and World Bank are largely to blame for 
the woeful economic state of ailing countries, it needs to be 
said that corrupt administrations in Argentina and Indonesia 
have contributed to the crisis. So far only one important 
Suharto crony has been tried for corruption. Others are 
untouched and continue to abuse power with impunity. In 
the meantime new actors have emerged in the post-Suharto 
period, as ruthless and corrupt as their predecessors. 
President Wahid was dethroned after being embroiled in a 
Rp 35 billion corruption case and now, the chair of parlia-
ment, Akbar Tandjung, is under investigation for embez-
zling Rp 40 billion. 
The Suharto pyramid was a steep one and all the major 
decisions were taken by the dictator himself, creating a 
more transparent structure of family and cronies who 
abused power and enriched themselves by grabbing juicy 
assets. That pyramid has collapsed and the power structures 
have fragmented into several dozen smaller pyramids. 
Three high-profile scandals have emerged in the recent 
past, known as Baligate, BLBigate and Buloggate. Not a 
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single individual has been found guilty. The Bank Bali case 
involved top people in Golkar, the former ruling party. The 
money went to a special team in charge of the re-election of 
Habibie. Quite a number of public figures, including cabi-
net ministers, were involved but after Habibie fail~d to get 
re-elected, the case was shelved. The BLBI case mvolved 
the recapitalisation of banks between 1997 and 1999. Rp 
145 trillion rupiahs was channelled through Bank Indonesia 
but the governor of the Bank, Syahril Sabirin, survived and 
the impeachment of President Wahid saved his skin. The 
Bulog case was also shelved after Wahid's impeachment. 
Civil society watchdogs like Indonesia Corruption Watch 
and Government Watch have uncovered many corruption 
cases involving highly-placed persons but so far impunity is 
still the name of the game. 
Growing disenchantment in Indonesia 
The huge debt burden will keep the public sector in a 
straitjacket. In a period of severe economic recession and 
growing unemployment, this is like a powder-keg as 
Argentina has shown. Even mainstream economists who, a 
few years back, were almost slavishly pro-IMF are becom-
ing anti IMF. Every IMF Letter of Intent tightens the strait-
jacket and the IMF recipe hasn't resolved anything. Many 
Indonesian economists have turned their backs on the devel-
opmentalist theories of the World Bank and the IMF. 
Revrisond Baswir from Gadjah Mada University has called 
for the export-oriented approach to be abandoned and to 
focus on the agricultural sector. He has also appealed for 
serious law enforcement and the eradication of corruption 
and nepotist practices. He also stresses the importance of 
small enterprises; in this period of deep recession, small 
businesses can keep the economy going at grassroots level. 
Drajat Wibowo, a researcher at INDEF, an Indonesian 
think-tank, has appealed for a non-conventional approach to 
the crisis. He has called for a reduction in debts to Japan, 
Indonesia's biggest creditor. He has abandoned the conven-
tional wisdom of the IMF and the World Bank. Prof. Nico 
Kalangie who teaches at the University oflndonesia has lost 
hope and says that only an angel from heaven can drag 
Indonesia out of the crisis. He has attacked the moral crisis 
among those holding high office and top bureaucrats. 
Political and economic crises are more than often inter-
twined. Indonesia wasted three Presidents in two years time 
and was surpassed by Argentina who wasted five Presidents 
in an a matter of two weeks. Nobody can predict what will 
happen with the Megawati government if it starts to default 
on its debts. * 
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Peasants and the struggle for land reform 
The struggle for agrarian reform in Indonesia, spearheaded by mass-based organisations such as 
the Federation of Indonesian Peasant Unions (FSPI - Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia) and its 
members, is the struggle for the future of Indonesia. By far the most abuses of human rights in 
Indonesia are related directly to access to land and the right to manage natural resources, many of 
which result in resort to state violence. 
With around 72 per cent of the population of Indonesia 
living in rural areas and 55 per cent being entirely depen-
dent on agricultural resources for a living, access to land is 
clearly of enormous economic significance to the majority 
of Indonesians. But it also has great social, cultural, histor-
ical and even religious significance. In other words, for the 
majority of Indonesians, agriculture is not an industry, it is 
a way of life. 
Land seizures since Dutch times 
The struggle for agrarian reform asserts that 
access to land and the right to manage natural 
resources is the basic right of the peasant, small 
scale and landless farmer. The steady erosion 
of land rights which began during the colonial 
period - the Dutch requiring that 20 per cent of 
cultivatable land be made over into state-run 
plantations - continued through Sukarno's rule, 
during which the nationalisation of Dutch 
interests such as plantations and forestry 
resulted in the assets being placed largely under 
the control of the military. 
But the theft of land and natural resources, 
forced evacuations and withdrawal of access 
rights reached its peak during Suharto's New 
Order regime. The corrupt financial interests of 
Suharto's family and cronies in business, the 
Recent peasant struggles 
A recent example is the arrest and beating of 4 7 peasant 
farmers from Cibaliung village, Banten, by Brimob officers 
and employees of the state forestry company, Perhutani, on 
11 November 2001. They were accused of illegally squatting 
on Perhutani land, despite having certificates of ownership, 
land titles, maps, tax returns and other documentation prov-
military and bureaucracy coupled with the drive for Land occupation by peasants from land owned by former dictator Suharto 
foreign exchange revenue and loans witnessed an 
uncompromising and often bloody drive towards the complete -
control and commoditization ofland. Millions oflndonesians 
lost ownership of and/or access to hundreds of thousands of 
hectares of land, with dire economic and social consequences. 
It is undoubtedly true that by far the largest number of 
human rights violations perpetrated in Indonesia are 
directly related to access to land and the right to manage 
natural resources. This is particularly true of cases which 
involve the pre-meditated and systematic use of state 
violence. The use of violence against peasant farmers and 
indigenous peoples asserting their right to reclaim their land 
since reformasi has not decreased. This includes violence at 
the hands of the police, military, paramilitaries as well as 
hired thugs and private security forces in the pay of state 
and private companies, including a number of multinational 
corporations. In many cases, land rights issues are manipu-
lated and described in terms of being solely about ethnic, 
religious and inter-communal conflict, armed separatism 
and the like. In addition, there is a growing trend to crimi-
nalise peaceful forms of peasant resistance, all of which 
somehow justifies' the use of repressive action. 
ing that the land is theirs. With military assistance, Perhutani 
had forced the farmers off their land back in 1980. In 1999, 
organised under the Banten Peasant Union (SPB, a member 
of the FSPI), 150 families reoccupied 300 ha of their land. 
On 12 November, 38 of the detainees were released on condi-
tion that they move off the land immediately. Upon their 
return, they found that their homes and all their possessions, 
as well as their crops had been razed to the ground. The other 
nine men, eight of whom are SPB activists, were still being 
held in custody as of 15 December 2001. 
The Sosa case of 18 August 2000, during which one 
villager died and six others sustained gunshot injuries when 
Brimob officers fired indiscriminately into a crowd, was 
one of the cases raised by the United Nations Committee 
Against Torture in Geneva on 16 November 2001. In this 
case, members of the North Sumatra Peasants Union 
(NSPU, a member of FSPI) and indigenous leaders were 
arrested and tortured on trumped-up charges of criminal 
damage relating to a land dispute with a privately-owned 
plantation company. One detainee was denied medical 
attention despite having been shot. Charges were brought 
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against 18 men who were sentenced to between one-and-a-
half and two-and-a-half years imprisonment. Sadly, no 
Brimob officer has been held accountable for the death of 
17-year old Febriadi Nasution. One year earlier, 25 Sosa 
farmers were arrested by Brimob, one of whom, Regar 
Botak, 60, died in custody (for details of the Sosa case see 
Down To Earth newsletter No. 47, or see website DTE: 
www.gn.apc.org/dte/4 7 olp.htm). 
Many land rights disputes in Indonesia have become 
campaign issues over the years, from indigenous rights in 
Kalimantan and West Papua, to mega-projects such as 
Kedung Ombo in Central Java and Indorayon in North 
Sumatra. These high profile cases which became famous 
either because of their 'scale', the involvement of foreign 
investment and aid or both, are but the tip of the iceberg. Yet 
cases such as Sosa and Banten are taking place on a daily 
basis in Indonesia. They involve pre-meditated and system-
atic use of repression, involving the collusion of local 
government, security forces, business interests and the 
courts of law. 
Genuine land reform needed 
It is therefore clear that a well-thought-out response to the 
systematic and often violent denial of land rights in 
Indonesia is urgently needed. For peasant organisations 
such as the FSPI, NSPU and SPB, the solution is clear - the 
implementation of genuine agrarian reform. The goal of 
agrarian reform, as they see it, is to return land rights 
(including stolen land) which guarantee a sustainable liveli-
hood and which see the empowerment of peasant farmers 
through direct participation in all political decisions which 
affect them. These demands have become more pressing 
still, as the success of the autonomy law depends on how far 
local communities take part in decision making about 
natural resources. 
According to NSPU lawyer, Ifwardi SH, Indonesia already 
has the legal basis for this in Law No.5 of 1960 pertaining 
to Agricultural Renewal (UUPA No.5 1960). Enacted 
during the Sukarno period, and largely influenced by the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), it is perhaps not 
surprising that UUPA 1960 contains many elements which 
are pro-peasant One example is the provision of Land 
Reform Tribunals and Land Reform Committees, which 
directly involve peasants in the decision-making process 
(these provisions were revoked by President Suharto in 
1970 and 1980 respectively). Ifwardi recognises the need 
for revision but the spirit of the original legislation is essen-
tially sound. 
However, the legislative assembly (MPR) passed a decree 
(TAP MPR No.IX/MPR/2001) on 9 November 2001 regard-
ing Agrarian Renewal and the Management of Natural 
Resources which in effect calls for the re-examination of 23 
items of related legislation. The NSPU's concern is that this 
will be a time-consuming process, leaving peasant farmers 
without effective legal protection. It is particularly 
concerned that any legislation enacted as a result of this 
decree will be largely determined by the demands and inter-
ests of the international agents of liberalisation, such as the 
World Bank, IMF, international corporations and the WTO. 
Land rights disputes in Indonesia are a time bomb. With 
former corrupt practices still rampant, and the government's 
need to safeguard foreign exchange earnings along with its 
commitment to crippling debt-servicing policies, the strug-
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gle for land looks set to intensify. Though it would be facile 
to explain the unfolding tragedies in Aceh and West Papua 
solely in these terms, the links are clear and serve as a grim 
warning to the Indonesian government and its investors. 
Unless concerted steps are taken to implement genuine 
agrarian reform which addresses the economic, social and 
cultural concerns of the majority of Indonesians, there can 
be no guarantee of human rights in Indonesia. 
You can contact:: North Sumatra Peasants Union 
(NSPU) - putratan@indosat.net.id and the Federation 
of Indonesian Peasant Unions - petani@indosat.net.id 
continued from page 12 
Speaking at the volunteers' exhibition in Jakarta on his last 
trip to Indonesia, Herb said: 'So those of us who believe in 
solidarity with Asians and people in other third world coun-
tries still have an awful lot of battles to fight, but it is a happy 
thing that we have been empowered in relation to those 
battles by a lot of very valuable Indonesian friendships.' The 
depth and breadth of these friendships become movingly 
obvious in the hundreds of tributes to Herb by his Indonesian 
friends, the memorial gatherings held in so many places, 
saying farewell to a true friend of the Indonesian people and 
a much-loved man. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
continued from page 13 
police station. And they were about to have dinner. 'It was 
the children who reported their parents' murder to the 
neighbours the day after. The children were only six years 
old and three years old. Their mother apparently rushed 
them to a room. Can you imagine them hiding under the 
bed ... and then the older child covered the younger child's 
mouth with her hand so the murderer wouldn't hear them? 
Can you imagine the trauma they have gone through?'. 
On her award, she said she was 'surprised and touched . .. 
no matter how little we do, there's someone who's paying 
attention. It makes me realise what a journey we've been 
through. It gives me new spirit.' * 
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IN MEMORIAM 
The passing of a much-loved man 
The news that Herb Feith had died in a tragic accident while cycling home in Melbourne came as 
a terrible shock to friends and colleagues around the world, above all to his numerous friends and 
students in Indonesia. For weeks the tributes flowed, in the Indonesian press and on the Internet. 
The sense of grief at his passing was palpable. 
As so many of his friends have said, the fact that Herb met Indonesia's failed attempt to establish a liberal democracy. I 
his death on a bicycle, as he had lived his life always on a well remember being present at one of those grand state 
bike, was a mark of the utter simplicity of the way he lived, occasions at the presidential palace, and hearing President 
worked, studied and taught. Sukarno fuming in front of a huge audience against this 
He died less than two weeks after his 71 st birthday. The 'unfriendly' assault on Indonesia's political system. 
previous month, he had visited Indonesia to attend an exhi- As one his Herb's post-graduate students, now Rector of 
bition to celebrate fifty years of Australian volunteers in Gadjah Mada University, Professor Ichlasul Amal, said in a 
Indonesia. It was his pioneering experience as a volunteer tribute at a memorial gathering in Yogya, the book has been 
that led to the creation of Australian Volunteers essential reading for all students of Indonesian politics for the 
International. past thirty years, and is especially relevant today as Indonesia 
Herb spent most of the 1990s teach- is once again struggling to build a liberal democracy. 
ing at the politics department of ------------------ After my husband and I were 
Gadjah Mada University in c:Ff,,,,. .._ I. ,.,. ._+ Fr;.. : -1-l. put behind bars following 
Yogyakarta, once again as a volun- C:Tl ~lA.Te/l,;{.J Jl!«-/ (; Suharto's rise to power, Herb took 
teer, having come full circle. This a close interest in our children, 
was after he resigned as director of J /\; ?£/" 119-,o J 5 Nv 11" ~ J Tari and Anto. Tari described him 
the Centre for Southeast Asia to me as 'the kindest and sweetest 
Studies at Monash University, man I have ever known. He came 
where he had taught for thirty to see us frequently and 
years. But after a brief stint as supported us when we were in 
director, he decided that running a need.' After they moved to 
department was not the kind of London, he was in regular col).tact 
thing he wanted to do. For most and when, after my own release, I 
academics, this would have been started campaigning for the 
the climax to a brilliant career but release of the huge number of 
it was not for him. He preferred to political prisoners still being 
spend his time among students and held, Herb gave us his generous 
colleagues, teaching and learning support. Every time we met, he 
in Indonesia, at a time of great would sit, legs outstretched, chin 
turmoil and change. As it turns out, resting on his hands, asking care-
he was there to observe the down- fully-phrased questions. He had a 
fall of Suharto, the stunning shift way of asking questions that 
in East Timor's fortunes with the forced you to think more deeply 
holding of a referendum and the about what you were thinking and 
new turmoil in the post-Suharto doing. 
Indonesia. Visiting him and Betty at their 
H~rb was born of Jewish parents in Vienna in 1930. When home in Melbourne in the late 1980s, I was struck by the 
he was still a boy, the family fled from Nazi-occupied simplicity of their home, the warm atmosphere in their 
Austria and found sanctuary as refugees in Australia. During kitchen and sitting room. I remember seeing in his study 
the Second World War, Herb became a peace activist work- carefullYlaid out cardboard files containing articles, cover-
ing with Christian and Quaker groups. In 1950, he went to ing the floor, with the minimum of furniture. Herb was a 
Indonesia as a volunteer, living on local wages and equipped man who never stopped learning, always keeping abreast of 
only with his air ticket and a bike. The bike became his developments in Indonesia. For him, as others have said, 
preferred means of transport throughout his life, until his academic study was a moral as well as an intellectual 
luck ran out and he was run over, crossing a railway line. endeavour. 
While working as a volunteer, he took a job at the ministry Few would remember because he said so little about it 
of information in Jakarta and became friends with Molly that he, like so many others, was blacklisted by Suharto in 
Bondan, who introduced me to the Feiths. His years in the early 1980s for sponsoring a letter critical of Indonesia's 
Indonesia and the research he undertook, watching the tortu- occupation of East Timor. In 1999, he was in East Timor 
ous political developments in the 1950s, led to his great acad- with an Indonesian student monitoring team for the referen-
emic achievement published in 1962, The Decline of dum and gave sanctuary to several East Timorese whose 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia in which he analysed lives were in danger from the army-sponsored militias. 
continued on page 11 
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HUMAN RIGHTS ··· 
Human rights activists honoured 
Two women human rights activists have been honoured with the Yap Thiam Hien award for 2001. 
One is honoured for her work against racism and the other is a well-known woman activist in Aceh. 
This award is named after one of Indonesia's foremost human rights lawyers. 
Ester Yusuf Purba, 30, founded Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa, 
(SNB) Solidarity for the Whole Nation, to focus in particu-
lar on the widespread discrimination against the ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. She told The Jakarta Post that the 
Indonesian people are basically racist, adding that the coun-
try's laws encourage discriminatory behaviour. 
Ever since her senior year at the University of Indonesia's 
School of Law, the 30-year old Ester has worked on human 
rights violations involving people from disadvantaged 
groups. One of the cases she worked on related to a 
Tarumanagara University student who was tortured to death 
by members of the campus student regiment (Menwa). She 
also campaigned against the bloody takeover of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) headquarters on July 
27, 1996, which triggered mass rioting. The SNB was set up 
two years after that event. 
Following the three-day May 1998 riots that struck major 
commercial centres in Jakarta and led to many hundreds of 
deaths and the raping of scores of ethnic Chinese women, 
Ester set up a shelter for the victims of lawlessness. 
She described racial discrimination in Indonesia as a 
'structural problem'. Dozens of racist laws are still in force, 
such as regulations about citizenship papers which are only 
obligatory for people of Chinese descent. Some say that the 
racist culture must be changed but Ester says this will take 
a very long time. 'First we have to change the laws because 
people think that the laws must be correct, whereas the idea 
that laws are made in the interest of the country's rulers or 
investors doesn't enter people's head, she said. 
She also stresses the need for changes in the educational 
system as a way to promote the establishment of anti-
discrimination institutions. The law against racial and ethnic 
discrimination is especially urgent now, as the problem 
exists not only between people of Chinese descent and 
'native' Indonesians, but also between other ethnic groups. 
Ester believes it is incorrect to focus solely on anti-Chinese 
discrimination, but to promote instead 'universal values' that 
should be shared by all members of society. 
Ester's perseverance in fighting discrimination has won her 
this year's Yap Thiam Hien human rights award. The 
committee chose her because of her success in raising public 
awareness of discrimination against ethnic Chinese both at 
home and abroad, after she spoke before the annual session 
of the United Nations' Human Rights Commission in April. 
Ester suffered a deep personal tragedy this year when her 
husband, Arnold Purba, himself a human rights activist, died 
suddenly soon after she returned home from attending several 
human rights events abroad. She was pregnant at the time 
with their second child. [Jakarta Post, 30 December 2001] 
Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, 33, has won acclaim for her 
years of activism on behalf of the women of Aceh, and is a 
leading activist in Flower, an organisation based in Banda 
Aceh. She told The Jakarta Post that intimidation and terror 
has been part of her everyday experience for years. For the 
past three years her phone has frequently been tapped and 
she receives threats over the phone. 
'I have received anonymous letters, direct threats and have 
also been picked up on the street.' She said that she and 
other Flower activists were quite used to their office being 
watched. 'Sometimes it's not clear who is carrying out all 
the terror. It could be either the Free Aceh Movement, 
GAM, or the Indonesian military, TNI,' she said. But the 
most difficult part was being stereotyped by both sides as 
the 'friends' of their enemies. 'And that comes with the ulti-
mate risk, death.' 
..-~----~-
As a Muslim woman, Suraiya keeps her head well covered 
but insists that this is a matter of personal choice and 
strongly rejects attempts to impose dress requirements on 
women. She first became aware of the problems around her 
when she was a student at the School of Chemical 
Engineering at the University of Syiah Kuala in Banda Aceh 
and when Aceh was still a military operations zone (DOM). 
Women were subjected to sexual violence and when men 
were branded as rebels, their wives would be kidnapped, 
maltreated and investigated. Even after DOM was lifted in 
August 1998, these practices continued and women were 
used as pawns by both sides. 
Flower initially helped women to set up small businesses 
and developed health programmes with traditional medi-
cines to help people suffering from trauma but later turned 
to giving women political education and knowledge about 
women's rights. With her colleagues in Flower, mostly 
women in their twenties and thirties, Suraiya often visits 
remote villages having to walk long distances because there 
is no transport. 
She spoke about a couple who were killed in their own 
house this year. The woman was a midwife while her 
husband was a plain-clothed member of staff at the local 
continued on page 11 
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Labour leader talks to TAPOL 
Dita Sari, Chairperson of the National Front for Indonesian Workers Struggle (FNPBI), toured the 
UK in November 2001, as a guest of the anti-sweatshop campaign, 'No Sweat'. She spoke to 
TAPOL about the current labour situation in Indonesia. 
Five years after the economic crisis, there are still some 
30-40 million workers in Indonesia who have not regained 
their jobs. And for those who are in employment, the gap 
between the poorly paid and the well paid only widens. A 
worker earns the equivalent of £40 a month, a local manager 
gets about £700, and a foreign manager gets £4000. 
Each agreement with the IMF and World Bank sees subsi-
dies further reduced, and so workers' wages have to stretch 
even further. Things like higher education become even 
more out of reach. .Multinational corporations in Indonesia 
say they treat their workers better than local compa-
nies, but it is not true. They claim to pay the minimum 
wage but this is not a living wage, which is almost 
nowhere to be found. Workers in export production 
may earn more, but only because there is more over-
time available, not because the basic wage is better. 
Impact of the War in Afghanistan 
There are two impacts from the war in Afghanistan. 
On the political front there is a lot of tension in 
Indonesia because some groups are using the banner 
of Islam. They say it is a war against Islam and are 
focusing on American and British people, and trying 
to confront 'western democracy'. They are not the 
mainstream but they are very aggressive. Even our 
office and demonstrations have been attacked, and 
some activists injured. So we now identify these 
groups as obstacles to democracy. They are very 
dangerous, and often harder to identify than when the 
military was openly active in suppressing us. Our 
response is to build a broad alliance with other pro-
democracy forces such as women's groups, NGOs, etc. 
The government continues to deny trade union freedom 
because it is scared of frightening the investors. The govern-
ment still has not changed politically from the old days. 
Under the new Manpower Law being discussed, any plant-
level union with ten members can register at the local level. 
This will open up the space for more unions outside the 
'yellow' SPSI. We are still affected financially because we 
have less access to check-off systems and have to collect 
union dues manually by waiting for workers outside the 
factory gate and so on. But there will be more opportunity 
On the economic front, not only are production . . . . 
orders slower as a result of the economic downturn but Demonstration rn Jakarta of workers who recently lost their Jobs 
' investors from these countries are becoming more reluctant. 
So workers are losing their jobs. 
The FNPBI programme focuses partly on the economic 
issues of wages and working time. We have been arguing 
that the minimum wage is based on wrong assumptions, for 
example that workers have the time to go to the cheapest 
market and then cook for themselves, when everyone knows 
that workers tend to buy cooked meals from the local stalls 
because they work such long hours. Also the minimum 
wage still only addresses the worker as a single person with-
out children or parents who depend on them. It does not 
include any allowance for the purchases which women need 
to make. 
ILO conventions not being practised 
At the political level, we continue to demand full union 
freedoms, that the old corrupt Orde Baru remnants, which 
remain in the unions, are expelled. The core ILO 
Conventions have been ratified but implementation is zero. 
to register formally. 
At the regency (kabupaten) level, a federation which has 
at least 25 plant-level unions in that area is entitled to sit 
in the tripartite bodies with government and employers. At 
the provincial level it is 50 or 60, I am not sure which. At 
national level, 100. The FNPBI can therefore certainly sit 
in tripartite bodies at national level, and also in some 
districts of East Java, JABOTABEK (Greater Jakarta 
region) and South Sulawesi. 
We expect the discussions will still be dominated by the 
'yellow' SPSI because they are still powerful. It is inter-
esting, however, that a number of the so-called 'reform' 
sectors of the SPSI-Reformasi, including those for 
garments/sportswear (TSK), pharmaceuticals/chemicals 
(Farkes ), metalworkers and woodworkers, have broken 
away from the SPSI-Reformasi to stand alone as sector 
organisations, 
continued on page 24 
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ACEH 
Can things ever get better in Aceh? 
'Ringing in the New Year' for 2002 was laden with woeful remarks about the end of a terrible year. 
Few people anywhere in the world had better reason to say this than the Acehnese and for them, it 
had nothing to do with September 11. Since the late 1980s, the Acehnese have never had a good 
year but 2001 was certainly the worst since they became part of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945. 
The most conservative estimate of the number of people 
killed is 1, 700, which is more than double the death toll in 
the previous year. The 2001 toll included casualties from a 
number of large-scale killings or massacres, assassinations 
of well-known figures and killings by 'OTK' or orang tak 
kenal' (unknown assailants). This was the year when hardly 
a day went by without at least one person being killed and 
on many days the death toll was upwards of five. 
This was the year when Indonesia's first democratically 
elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, bowed to pressure 
from the armed forces to issue 'Presidential Instruction 
IV /2001' in April, setting in motion new military operations 
and taking Aceh further and further away from the prospect 
of dialogue. Six months later, his successor, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, issued her own 'Presidential Instruction 
VII/2001 '. She needed no prompting from the armed forces 
to do this. 
Territorial integrity justifies abuses 
Whereas in her state address on 16 August, less than a 
month after taking office as president, Megawati apologised 
to the people of Aceh and Papua for years of human rights 
abuses and acknowledged that 'past government policies in 
Aceh has been wrong and harmful to the people', by the end 
of the year, she had changed her tune completely. Shortly 
after issuing her own presidential instruction for Aceh, she 
told the troops, during an army parade in Jakarta on 29 
December, to do everything in their power 'to hold the coun-
Acehnese woman in the middle of Brimob froces 
try together' and 'not to worry about whether you are violat-
ing human rights' . 
This was the year, like so many previous years, in which 
not a single human rights violation was brought to account, 
no one was charged or tried even for killing high-profile 
personalities, regardless of the solemn promises by the 
police to conduct 'rigorous' investigations and bring the 
perpetrators to justice. 
With Megawati now holding the reins of power in Jakarta, 
it is clear that the military are getting their way on all fronts 
in Aceh. Most commentators agree that this is the 'price' 
Megawati has had to pay in return for armed forces backing 
for her presidency. But this is not the whole story. Megawati 
is first and foremost a nationalist, for whom Indonesia's 
territorial integrity is sacred. Of course, there are other ways 
to persuade the Acehnese - and also the Papuans - to remain 
within the fold of the Indonesian Republic. Even if only a 
few armed forces officers who are known to have killed, 
tortured or persecuted Acehnese people, were to be brought 
to trial, this could work wonders for Indonesia's reputation 
with the Acehnese people. 
In October, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Yusril 
Izha Mahendra proposed the establishment of an ad hoc court to 
try those responsible for three Acehnese cases of gross violation 
in 1999 that were identified two years ago by an independent 
investigation team set up under President Habibie. 
The three cases in question are, firstly, abductions, torture 
and killings perpetrated in the last two years of the DOM 
(military operations zone) period at a torture 
centre known as Rumoh Geudong in the 
district of Pidie, This building was the 
notorious headquarters of the army's 
elite commandos, Kopassus. The second 
relates to forced disappearances and 
killings in Idi Cut and Arakundoe, East 
Aceh on 2 May 1999, and the third is the 
shooting at Simpang Tiga KKA (the 
Kertas Kraf Aceh Pulp and Paper Plant 
crossroads), Krueng Geukeuh, North 
Aceh on 3 May 1999. 
Since all these atrocities occurred 
before the enactment of the 1999 
Human Rights Law identifying a 
number of crimes as gross human 
rights violations for the first time, they 
would have to be tried before an ad hoc 
court, with special retroactive powers. 
Such a court can only be set up by the 
President in consultation with the DPR, 
but will she do this, knowing full well 
that in all three cases, army officers would 
be in the dock? 
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Military fully in charge 
Defying all rational thought about how best to solve the 
prolonged conflict in Aceh, the military role is being greatly 
intensified. President Wah id's Instruction IV /200 l in April 
gave the army the power to set up a special command, 
Kolakops, to handle the security situation alongside the 
police. Although the instruction set in motion a six-point 
comprehensive programme, the only point put into practice 
was the 'security' angle. In September, Megawati renewed 
the policy by issuing her own Instruction VIl/2001. 
However this appears not to be adequate in the eyes of the 
military. In early January, they announced their intention to 
set up a new territorial military command for Aceh, Kodam 
Iskandar Muda, after obtaining the necessary backing from 
President Megawati . The idea was mooted back in 1999 by 
then armed forces commander-in-chief, General Wiranto, 
but was quickly dropped because of the fear widely 
expressed in Aceh that this would result in a return to the 
grim days of DOM from 1989 till 1998. In the event, even 
without a special Kodam, human rights abuses have contin-
ued to escalate in Aceh. 
The military said this would be done only after securing 
the agreement of the Acehnese people. Many civil society 
organisations issued statements strongly opposing the move 
yet within days, it was announced that the new military 
command would go ahead. 
The move to restore the separate military command for 
Aceh has several motivations. One is political, to serve the 
army's desire to assert a greater role in 'solving' the conflict 
in Aceh. According to human rights lawyer Bambang 
Widjojanto, Megawati appears to have been persuaded that 
a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the conflict would take a 
very long time so she has accepted the need for a 'short cut', 
the crush-them-with-the-military-way.' [The Jakarta Post, 4 
January 2002] Another motive is to eliminate the need to 
designate troops as 'non-organic' which has applied to 
troops from outside Aceh but within the Bukit Barisan 
command based in Medan, North Sumatra. And another is 
to localise the problems of Aceh and leave it to the local 
authorities to handle. 
Human rights activist Hendardi, who spent months inves-
tigating human rights abuses in Aceh in the late 1990s 
described the move as a 'backward step for democracy. It 
must be seen as a territorial power grab by the army, an 
extremely political move to reclaim power and reassert their 
political authority in the regions. In fact, what needs to 
happen in Aceh is a withdrawal of military forces, not a 
reinforcement.' [ AFP, 4 January 2002] 
One of the country's top officials who has been actively 
promoting the establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda is 
the governor of Aceh, Abdullah Puteh, who has been 
present at all discussions in Jakarta on the subject. Abdullah 
Puteh is from GOLK.AR and is known to be very close to 
the military. His appointment as governor was initially 
opposed by President Wahid. The Jakarta Post asked in an 
end-of-year assessment about Aceh: 'Why has Aceh 
accepted as its governor Abdullah Puteh, of GOLK.AR, a 
party that was also responsible for the introduction of the 
deadly operations in the late 1980s?' [The Jakarta Post, 27 
December 2001] 
Until 1985, there were three separate military commands 
in North Sumatra, one of which was Kodam Iskandar Muda. 
They were then incorporated into a single Kodam Bukit 
Barisan based in Medan. 
No prospects for dialogue . 
The chances of dialogue with the armed resistance, GAM, 
have been struck a severe blow with the announcement by 
the government in Jakarta that talks are now a matter for the 
local government and that there will be no further role for a 
foreign mediator. This decision scales down the level of th_e 
talks and is intended to demote the status of GAM. Until 
now, the talks have been brokered by the Henri Dunant 
Centre - recently renamed the Humanitarian Dialogue 
Centre - which still has a presence in Banda Aceh. The 
central government now claims that using the services of a 
foreign mediator creates the impression that the talks are on 
a state-to-state basis. 
The inevitable consequence of the change is that GAM is 
not likely to accept the change. In a statement issued by a 
spokesperson, Tgk Sofyan Dawod, on 4 January, GAM 
stated that a change of this nature cannot be made unilater-
ally and warned that the decision was 'very unwise' . A few 
days later, the armed resistance movement announced that it 
was calling a three-day strike in Aceh from 16 - 18 January, 
citing the decision to create the new command as one of the 
reasons. 
Talks have come to a standstill since July 2001 when six 
GAM negotiators who were taking part in talks at a hotel in 
Banda Aceh were arrested by the police, in a serious breach of 
faith. Five of the men were subsequently released. The sixth 
man has since been charged and is currently on trial in Jakarta. 
The Megawati government and the military are digging their 
heels in and opting for a undiluted 'military solution' with 
more troops, more operations and more human rights abuses, 
and with an agenda that now excludes all prospects for further 
talks. All in all, the prospects for 2002 are grim indeed. 
Judicial review sought by NGOs 
A group ofNGOs in Jakarta announced in December that 
they were filing for a judicial review of the president's deci-
sion to issue Presidential Instruction VII/2001, prolonging 
the presidential instruction issued six months earlier by her 
predecessor, Wahid Abdurrahman. The three NGOs 
involved are Kontras, the Commission for the Disappeared 
and the Victims of Violence, PBHI, the Legal Aid and 
Human Rights Institute, and ELSAM, the Institute for 
Social Studies and Advocacy. Spokesmen for the group said 
the earlier presidential instruction had done nothing to 
uphold human rights; on the contrary, it had given protec-
tion to those who were perpetrating abuses. The two 
instructions have legalised military repression and enabled 
the security forces to engage in acts of violence on a 
massive scale. They provided the military with the protec-
tion they needed to conduct operations to crush GAM and 
halt dialogue. 
'What President Megawati should have done,' said 
Johnson Panjaitan of the PBHI, 'was to repeal presidential 
instruction IV /2001 and issue a president decree providing 
for human rights abuses to be brought to justice in an ad 
hoc court or the human rights court created under Law 
2612000 on Human Rights Court. [Kompas Cyber Media, 7 
December 2001] 
Recent atrocities 
With atrocities happening every day, no atrocities that we 
describe will do justice to the sufferings of the Acehnese. 
But for the record, we have chosen three incidents: 
continued on page 22 
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Dirty war in Central Sulawesi 
Many analysts say that the only hope for Indonesia's survival is religious tolerance. Unfortunately, 
there are places in this huge archipelago where this kind of tolerance has vanished. A vicious reli-
gious war, known as the 'Poso conflict', is being waged in Central Sulawesi. Both Christians and 
Muslims have used brutal violence against each other. 
More than 2.500 people are estimated to have been killed 
since the conflict began three years ago and 80,000 people 
have fled their homes, becoming internally dis-placed 
people. This makes it one of the bloodiest communal 
conflicts in Indonesia. 
The Poso conflict has not been widely reported because of 
its remoteness from urban centres and because it has been 
confined to the locality without spreading to other areas. 
Reports only appear in the press when the fighting becomes 
particularly vicious or the when refugees start streaming 
into other districts. 
But after the 11 September tragedy in the US, 
front page reports started to appear in the 
domestic and interna-tional press when 
Minister/Security Chief Hendropriyono made a 
sweeping but unsubstantiated claim that the Al 
Qaeda international terrorist network had set up 
a training camp in Poso. Other recent develop-
ments that grabbed the headlines included the 
vicious attack in late November and early 
December by Laskar Jihad forces on a series of 
Christian villages along the coast. The villages 
of Batelemba, Tangkura, Patiwunga, Sangginora 
and Dewua were burnt to the ground. 
Earlier reports indicated that the notorious 
Laskar Jihad militia had moved their eastern 
Indonesia headquarters from Ambon to Poso, 
apparently because of the crackdown on 
several Laskar Jihad centres in Ambon by the 
military. The death sentences passed against 
three Christian militia leaders, Fabianus Tibo, 
Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Ruwu who 
were found guilty of killing several hundred Muslims in the 
Walisongo boarding school in mid-May 2000, was also 
widely reported in the Indonesian press. 
Violence from both sides 
As is so often the case, the protracted conflict started with 
a trivial incident in 1998 when in a drunken brawl between 
a Christian and a Muslim youth triggered a wave of 
violence. Since then, local community leaders have been 
unable to maintain a ceasefire for any length of time. Al-
most daily, Christian or Muslim villages have been at-
tacked. Both sides use a wide variety of weapons: bombs, 
home-made weapons, knives together with more sophisti-
cated weaponry. Following the arrival from Java of several 
thousand Laskar Jihad forces in the middle of 2001, the 
rather even balance between the Christian and Muslim mi-
litia shifted in favour of the Muslim forces. Christian vil-
lages have been heavily targeted and thousands of Chris-
tians were forced to flee their homes to the Tentena district, 
the stronghold of the Christians. The city of Poso, the capi-
tal of Poso district, is now the headquarters of the Muslims. 
Before the conflict erupted, Poso was a thriving city where 
both communities lived side by side at all levels. 
In the earlier stages of the conflict, the Christian militia 
under the leadership of brutal killers like Fabianus Tibo 
committed many atrocities against Muslims. Much to the 
relief of many Christians, Tibo was arrested, tried and sen-
tenced to death, together with two others, Dominggus da 
Silva and Marinus Riwu, for their role in the massacre of 
hundreds of Muslim students in the Walisongo Boarding 
School. It was even claimed that Tibo gave the order for 
A former village in Poso, left in ruins 
Muslims who were seeking refuge to be killed. 
Poso and Tentena have become virtual war zones. The 
military and the police have become the decisive factor. 
Christian civil servants can only travel to their offices in 
Poso under the protection of security officers, while Mus-
lims can only enter the Christian towns of Tentena or Sepe 
under police or military escort. 
Communal conflicts in Indonesia 
The Poso conflict is one of many communal conflicts that 
have erupted since the fall of the Suharto dictatorship. The 
mushrooming of communal conflicts is directly related to 
the fall of the authoritarian regime which created what many 
scholars call a security dilemma. The rigid vertical structure 
of law and order under Suharto collapsed and has been 
replaced by multi-layered patron-client relationships under 
Jakarta and local elites. Groups in a locality, in par-ticular in 
trouble spots, intensify efforts to protect their own commu-
nity by organising militias and stockpihng weapons. 
It is also undeniably true that unscrupulous and ma-nipu-
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lative power brokers, mainly politicians or senior military 
officers, want to gain leverage in the power strug-gle by 
encouraging communal rivalries. The emergence of groups 
like Laskar Jihad who have close ties to elements within the 
military is a good example. Neither the Gus Dur nor the 
Megawati governments have been able to stamp out the 
activities of this radical group despite its unpopularity in the 
eyes of the public. 
Economic interests often play a determining role in 
communal conflicts. The economic meltdown of Indonesia 
since 1997 has only intensified the battle for limited natural 
resources. The region of Poso is very wealthy. The soil is 
very fertile and some 30 per cent of the land· has been 
scheduled for use as cocoa plantations, an important cash 
crop. Poso also has palm oil, copra and clove plantations 
.and it is one of the few remaining places in the archipelago 
where ebony is still being exported. The National Maritime 
Council revealed in 1998 that there were 32 sites of large 
untapped oil deposits in the northern Tomini Bay. 
For all its good intentions, the autonomy law which came 
into force at the beginning of 2001 has also resulted in shifts 
in the power structure. Local district chiefs have become 
more important which in turn creates new layers of conflict 
between the district and provincial elites, or feuds with local 
military or police. 
Al Qaeda training ground? 
It was to be expected that retired Lt. General Abdullah 
Hendropriyono, arguably the most influential military offi-
cer in the Megawati cabinet, would come out with a claim 
that Al Qaeda built a training camp in Poso two years ago. 
Jafar Umar Talib, the flamboyant leader of Laskar Jihad, 
vehemently denied the allegation. He admitted that he had 
been trained in Afghanistan in the eighties but denied that 
he had any ties with Al Qaeda. 
Hendropriyono almost certainly made this claim so as to 
join the Washington 'coalition' in its war against interna-
tional terrorism. It came within days of the generous offer 
by President Bush promising hundreds of millions of dol-
lars to the governments of countries thought to be har-bour-
ing terrorists. So far there has been no evidence of any Al 
Qaeda presence in Poso and Hendropriyono's statement 
created quite a stir among commentators, forcing the secu-
rity chief to retract his statement. 
A similar controversy erupted in Washington when hard-
liner Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defence secretary (who was 
the US ambassador to Indonesia during the nine-ties) hinted 
at the possibility of Indonesia harbouring ter-rorists while 
the State Department has as yet failed to add any Indonesian 
organisation or movement to its the list of terrorist organisa-
tions. A new version has now emerged in Washington 
according to which there is no connection between Laskar 
Jihad and Al Qaeda; according to this ver-sion, the training 
ground in Poso was set up by foreigners, for foreigners. 
Be that as it may, the controversy has thrust the Poso 
conflict onto the front pages of the international press and 
the 11 September tragedy has given this local conflict an 
international dimension. But for the local people, Chris-
tians and Muslims alike, the controversy has had little bear-
ing on their dire situation. The security situation has failed 
to improve; an ineffective · government in Jakarta and alle-
gations from Washington seem only to have prolonged the 
suffering of the people in Poso and Tentena. 
Indonesian authorities trying to isolate the Poso conflict 
After more news of Christians fleeing their homes in 
December, Megawati's minister-coordinator for security 
affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono headed a large team of 
ministers and generals to the area. But since then, apart 
from occasional reports in the press about the possibility of 
declaring a state of emergency, nothing has happened to get 
to the root of the problem. No one has dared to mention the 
need to expel the Laskar Jihad thugs from the region for the 
obvious reason that they enjoy the backing of important ele-
ments within the military. 
Reconciliation efforts 
The two major religious holidays, Idul Fitri and Christ-
mas, occurred within days of each other in 2001. The op-
portunity was used by the authorities to bring leaders of the 
two feuding parties together. The Poso meeting took place 
in Malino, a historic venue where the Dutch and the Indo-
nesians once held a meeting after the Second World War to 
discuss the future of the former Dutch East Indies. 
Yusuf Kalla, the co-ordinating minister for people's 
welfare, chaired the meeting between the so-called 'White 
Group' (the Muslims) and the 'Red Group' (the Christians). 
On the first day each side voiced their grievances: the White 
Group had nine complaints while the Red Group had six, 
which only points to the depth of the cleavage between the 
two communities. 
So far this kind of top-down approach to peace and rec-
onciliation has achieved very little. Four previous meetings 
led nowhere for the simple reason that grassroots elements 
from the two communities were not involved. 
The arrival of fresh troops, including both military and 
police units, seems to have halted the eruption of new vio-
lence for the moment. It remains to be seen whether this 
latest peace effort reflects a degree of war-weariness and a 
genuine feeling of reconciliation from both sides. 
The huge death toll, the 80,000 people who are now inter-
nally displaced and the extensive destruction of property, 
houses, churches and mosques, gives some idea of the effort 
and time that will be needed before things in the area can 
get back to anything approaching normality. * 
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Made in Indonesia, Dan La Botz, South End 
Press, 2001, Cambridge Massachusets, ISBN 
0-89608-64 2-9 
This is a valuable and timely book for anyone interested 
in the development of democracy in Indonesia. It is well 
written and easy to read and Dan La Botz is to be thor-
oughly congratulated for it. 
Dan La Botz's focus is the new trade unionism and left-
wing political movement in Indonesia in the context of 
global capitalism. Based on interviews and research in the 
country in mid-1999 and mid-2000, plus written sources 
available in English, he takes the reader through the major 
developments - the organisations and the key individuals -
that have been at the heart of the Indonesian workers' move-
ment, especially since the 1990s. 
Virtually all the main players are covered in depth. They 
include Dita Sari and the FNPBI (National Front for 
Indonesian Workers' Struggle), Muchtar Pakpahan and the 
SBSI (Indonesian Workers' Welfare Union), and Rustam 
Aksam and the TSK textile, garment and leather workers' 
federation - the most successful of the break-away SPSI-
Reformasi elements from the old, official labour organisa-
tions of Suharto's New Order. 
Dan La Botz also does not miss out the important role of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some were very 
instrumental, by developing programmes of workers' educa-
tion, mobilisation, and advocacy. They include the legal aid 
institutes (LBH), church-based bodies, and women's groups. 
Also covered are old organisations that have resurfaced after 
twenty-five years, such as SARBUMUSI. 
Though the book is very comprehensive, not all interest-
ing organisations are there. Those missing include some of 
the small yet most genuine and democratic workers' organ-
isations. Also valuable might have been interviews with the 
old New Order cronies who still try to exercise some muscle 
to corrupt the workers' movement. There are also a few 
errors, such as the FBSI sometimes becoming FSBI. 
Nevertheless it is a book which surely ought to be read by 
all those active in international support for Indonesian 
workers' rights - from the international trade union move-
ment, to the labour-oriented NGOs, to the anti-sweatshop 
campaigners of Australia, Europe and North America. This 
is important because there is very little else around in 
English on the subject, certainly not in such a full and 
accessible form. 
One of the greatest services of the book is the potted polit-
ical history of Indonesia, going back into the early colonial 
period. I have never come across such a succinct, intelligi-
ble version in English, which can give today's solidarity 
supporters a sense of where the Indonesian democracy 
movement has come from. It would be good if at least this 
part of the book can be translated into Indonesian to ma~e. it 
available to Indonesia's workers who, as one labour act1v1st 
put it to me, are largely "orphans from their history" . 
There is also a detailed chapter on the PRD (People's 
Democratic Party). As an international socialist, Dan La 
Botz makes it clear that he is impressed with this new polit-
ical party, whose leaders he h~s intervie_wed at l~~gth. Here 
as in the rest of the book, he is honest m descnbmg weak-
nesses as well as strengths. But he nevertheless admires the 
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PRD's consistent socialist stance. It is perhaps a pity, 
though, that he does not analyse in depth any of the other 
contemporary Indonesian political parties. In the end, Dan 
La Botz's book is a political statement rather than a 
detached analysis. 
Perhaps the weakest part is the final chapter on interna-
tional solidarity. This is a complex issue and he only really 
goes into depth on US support, for example through the 
American Center for International Labor Solidarity 
(ACILS) and the United Students Against Sweatshops 
(USAS). In that sense, this is very much an 'American's 
book', solidarity seen through the eyes of an American. 
There is of course much more to say about this topic. He 
makes a very short, sweeping and dubious statement about 
the nature of the German union support. There is little else 
on bilateral union links, e.g. from Australia, Europe, 
Scandinavia or elsewhere. 
He misses out entirely the role of the ILO office in 
Jakarta, whose trade union education programme has been 
funded with a million pounds from the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID). It has been criticised 
for being oriented towards the 'Reformasi' parts of the old 
official unions and much less supportive of other democra-
tic workers' initiatives. 
Nor does he analyse the support of the ten International 
Trade Secretariats (ITSs ), which are sector/industry-based 
international trade union federations. Some have affiliated 
the Reformasi-wing of the old unions; some have also affil-
iated a new union such as an SBSI sector; and some have 
deliberately not accepted any affiliate yet but focus instead 
on education programmes involving several organisations. 
So there is not a single approach even from the international 
trade union movement. 
There are many more initiatives and debates on interna-
tional workers' solidarity with Indonesia which are barely 
mentioned, if at all. So it might have been better not to 
embark on an ambitious chapter but to limit it to just US 
solidarity activities. 
That said, the book as a whole is a must for all support-
ers of democracy in Indonesia. One of Dan La Botz's aims 
is to increase international understanding of Indonesia. As 
an American, he speaks of the prejudice that he finds among 
his fellow Americans against Asian people and Muslims as 
if they are 'not capable of democratic development'. How 
much more timely, then, is this book post 11 September. 
Celia Mather 
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Ian Martin, SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
EAST TIMOR, The United Nations, the 
Ballot, and International Intervention, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, USA, 2001, 171 pp, ISBN 
1-58826-033-X 
This is an important book by one of the key players in the 
dramatic events in East Tim or in 1999. The author was the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the 
East Timor Popular Consultation. Ian Martin arrived in Dili 
on 1 June 1999 to lead UNAMET, the UN Mission in East 
Timor. When he left East Timor on 14 September, the coun-
try had been wrecked, as a result of destruction and killings 
by TNI, the Indonesian military and their proxy, the militia. 
Six days after UNAMET closed down, the International 
Force for East Timor arrived in Dili . 
Ian Martin does not claim to give an objective account 
of events. As head of UNAMET he was responsible for 
overall assessments and recommendations, which gives his 
words added weight. He came to the job after years of expe-
rience in the UN, prior to which he was Amnesty 
International's general secretary in the mid-eighties. 
Therefore, he was not unfamiliar with the complexities of 
the East Timor issue. His team included several top-ranking 
UNAMET officials who were very knowledgeable about 
East Timor, greatly enhancing its effectiveness. 
On the negative side, it has to be said that the author is 
often too cautious, inevitable perhaps from someone high 
up in the UN hierarchy. His assessments are worded with 
such care that he gives the impression that he is holding his 
punches. 
1999 was indeed a turning point in the history of East 
Timor; after years of neglect, this tiny country finally 
became a focus of international attention. Ian Martin's 
account is both analytical and highly readable. It includes 
the unexpected decision of the Habibie government to agree 
to a ballot; the flawed 5 May UN agreement; the mounting 
wave of violence by TNI (the Indonesian armed forces), 
POLRI (the Indonesian Police) and militia gangs; the 
mounting international pressure on Jakarta; the referendum 
itself and the massive destruction in the first two weeks of 
September. It should be said that while many books have 
been written about this period of East Timor's history, Ian 
Martin's account will occupy a special place. 
This review focuses on two very contentious issues: how 
and why the 5 May agreement was accepted and the back-
ground to the destruction that followed the vote. 
Why the flawed modalities were agreed 
An understanding of how and why the 5 May agreement 
which established the modalities of the popular consultation 
in East Timor came into being, is sure to remain a matter of 
controversy. Even though it was widely acknowledged that 
the agreement was flawed, it was accepted as the basis for 
holding a ballot. Many within the international East Timor 
solidarity movement were very unhappy with the security 
arrangements. The author devotes twenty-two pages to this 
question and explains how ultimately, everyone, the East 
Timorese political factions, Portugal, Australia, USA and the 
international community decided to accept the modalities. 
Indonesia was inflexible. It alone should be responsible 
for security during the vote; other options, such as the with-
drawal and/or disarming the paramilitary, as requested by 
the UN, the Timorese and other parties, were rejected ou~ of 
hand by the Indonesian team. The only concession F?re1gn 
Minister Ali Alatas would accept was for a small contmgent 
of CIVPOL (UN Civilian Police) to take part in an advisory 
role. Later some eighty military liaison officers (MLOs) 
were added to the UN contingent. In hindsight, it can be 
argued that giving the TNl/POLRI responsibility for secu-
rity created the conditions for the destruction of East Timor. 
Martin gives a step-by-step account of this process. 
The bottom line is the window of opportunity that gave 
the momentum to the 5 May Agreement. The pressure on 
the Jakarta government to find a solution for East Timor, 
including domestic pressure (not discussed by Martin) had 
become almost unbearable. President Habibie and his inner 
team of advisers opted for a swift and elegant solution: 
whatever the outcome of the vote, implementation should 
be immediate. The East Timorese leadership had been 
prepared to accept a transition of five or even ten years prior 
to independence but Habibie wanted to pack up and leave 
instantly if the vote went for independence, making the tran-
sition to independence much less complex. 
On the other hand, there were serious political problems 
regarding the Indonesian presidency. The chances of 
Habibie being elected president the following year were 
remote. Megawati, the obvious front-runner, would be most 
unlikely to open the way for East Timor. The unspoken 
consensus in the international community was that the 
referendum should be wrapped up before the general elec-
tions in Indonesia. This helps to explain why the 5 May 
Agreement was so speedily adopted. 
Historic photo of Indonesian troops during the invasion 
of East Timor in December 1975 
The Portuguese, having consulted with the East Timorese 
leaders, decided to go for this option. Despite receiving 
daily reports about mounting violence by militia groups, the 
UN went along with this and by the last week of April the 
two other key players, the US and Australia, fell in line by 
not taking too strong a stand on the security provisions, as 
Martin convincingly explains. Any attempt to exert strong 
pressure on Jakarta regarding security might have delayed 
the ballot indefinitely. 
UNAMET in action 
A large chunk of the book focuses on the preparation and 
holding of the ballot, an event that will go down in history 
as one of the better achievements of the UN. The many UN 
workers and the hoards of volunteers worked with great 
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dedication. There is no doubt that the ballot complied with 
international standards and, to crown it all, the participation 
of the East Timorese was overwhelming. No one could 
better describe the process than Martin, who was on top of 
everything. As militia violence increased by the day, the 
author's frustration and anger comes through powerfully, 
having to deal daily with the so-called representatives of the 
pro-integration Timorese. For the sake of 'neutrality', these 
obscure groups played a prominent role in the preparatory 
process. UNAMET had to play along with this game while 
everybody knew who had the support of the population. 
The nature of, and the background to, the violence 
throughout the year up to the arrival of the peacekeeping 
forces on 20 September is a red thread through the book. 
But there are inconsistencies in explaining this and 
analysing the violence as part of a grand scheme designed 
at military HQ in Jakarta. As head of UNAMET, the author 
was in constant contact with the responsible Indonesian 
officers, Colonel Tono Suratman and Colonel Noer Muis, 
the military commanders in East Timor during 1999, Major-
General Zacky Anwar Makarim who was the key figure in 
the Indonesian Task Force for the East Timor Ballot, and 
Police Colonel Timbul Silaen, chief of police in East Timor. 
According to the modalities of the 5 May Agreement, these 
were the men in charge of security. 
As UNAMET head, Martin, these men did little to 
conceal from him that violence was inevitable and that mass 
evacuation of the population to West Timor would occur. 
Together with the mounting violence by the militia in the 
form of daily acts of terror, it was crystal clear that the after-
ballot violence was part of a grand scheme. Along with 
Geoff Robinson, political affairs officer of UNAMET, 
Martin has searched for evidence to prove beyond doubt 
that the destruction and mass evacuation of East Timor in 
September was part of a plan. 
According to Robinson, the available documents 'do not 
provide definitive proof of direct high-level involvement in 
planning or carrying out specific acts of violence, either 
before or after the ballot'. Robinson's analysis includes two 
related possibilities. One is a breakdown in the chain of 
military command, leading to a loss of control at army head-
quarters over key elements in the armed forces. 'A second 
possibility is that the violence was not the product of an 
explicit plan or command, but was at least in part the result 
of a deeply embedded pattern of thinking and behaviour 
within the TNI.' 
Martin is convinced that the post-ballot violence was 
directed by the TNI and that the co-ordination and planning 
must have happened 'at least as high as the provincial 
(KOREM) level, and very likely higher' The lack of docu-
mentary proof compels Martin to include Robinson's more 
cautious views into his analysis of the events. 
The lack of a 'smoking gun' is frequently the problem in 
analysing many tragic events in Indonesia. 'Operasi 
Komodo', the military intelligence operation that preceded 
the invasion of East Timor, has been widely discussed by 
analysts on East Timor but written evidence is missing. The 
stage-managed ballot in West Papua in 1969 where a few 
hundred hand-picked men voted in favour of Indonesia was 
another successful intelligence operation. None of these 
events have been properly investigated, nor can they be 
without the political will of the Indonesian authorities, 
which has been lacking for almost 35 years. 
Organising the militia and the violence in East Timor 
since early 1999 was clearly part of a concerted plan, as 
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convincingly portrayed by the author. In the early months, 
the strategy was to create so much fear that the people 
would not dare to vote for independence. This position 
probably switched at least twice in the run-up to the ballot. 
Around the time Martin arrived in Dili, military intelligence 
in Jakarta may have concluded that the ballot could not be 
won, leaving them with two options: to make it impossible 
to hold the ballot or design a contingency plan of destruc-
tion and mass evacuation. Both options were put into prac-
tice with TNI officers being more and more openly involved 
in the escalating violence. Martin had the impossible task of 
making sure the ballot went ahead, while urging New York 
to exert pressure on Jakarta to stop the violence. 
Military intelligence operations are by their very nature 
secret and leave no smoking guns. It is not too late to delve 
deeper into this sinister plot. An ad hoc human rights court 
on East Timor is due to start in Jakarta in January to hear 
cases against the perpetrators of this violence though it 
remains to be seen how effectively the court will function. 
If properly conducted, these trials could bring to light the 
'secrets' of the violence in East Timor. * 
Liem Soei Liong 
continued from page 26 
are also looking at other ways of advancing their strategy, 
bearing in mind that the need to end impunity is also a 
major concern of colleagues in the Indonesian NGO move-
ment who could use justice for East Timor as a precedent 
for justice in so many other cases. 
The possibility of preparing legal cases against leading 
generals and using the courts of the US and European coun-
tries, which have shown a willingness to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, is an idea which was considered at a confer-
ence on Impunity in Indonesia in Amsterdam in early 
December. 
Volunteers at the Amsterdam International Law Clinic are 
carrying out research into the possibility of bringing three 
generals to trial outside Indonesia. They are Wiranto for 
crimes committed in East Timor, Hendropriyono for his 
involvement in an attack on the village in Talangsari, 
Lampung in February 1989 when at least 200 were killed, 
and Djadja Suparman for his involvement in atrocities 
committed in Maluku. The results of the research should be 
available shortly. Indonesia House, a coalition of Dutch 
NGOs which hosted the Amsterdam conference is develop 
ing a plan of action for the campaign against impunity for 
the next three years. * 
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One observer who was in Aceh for several weeks in late 
200 I confined herself to describing a series of incidents in 
Simpang Rambong, North Aceh. The village is accessible 
only by a very rough road and is located near an area known 
to be a GAM stronghold. In early December, according to 
the villagers, Indonesian soldiers arrived early in the 
evening, in Panther armoured vehicles, leaving a trail of 
destruction in their wake. Ten village houses were burnt in 
what the villagers insisted was an unprovoked attack. 
Several people were injured but with no clinic or doctor in 
the area, their wounds remained untreated. 
A week later, the troops returned in greater numbers and 
carried out indiscriminate shooting. This time, a 13-year old 
boy, Ridwan was shot dead as he took cover inside the 
family home. Ridwan's mother said the soldiers shot 
through the window, smashing a mirror and killing the boy. 
Heavily armed police patrols along the main roads in Aceh 
Around the house lay the bullet castings. Many mJunes 
sustained by the villagers were from bayonets. [Lesley 
McCulloch in Asia Times, 4 January 2002] 
In a village in Central Aceh, not far from the district capi-
tal, Takengon, a woman who was seven months pregnant 
was set upon by a gang of ten men, some wearing army 
uniforms, the others in civvies. The woman who related her 
terrible experience in a state of great distress, insisted on 
being identified only by her initials. It happened on 14 
December, in the middle of Ramadhan, the fasting month, 
when SN was alone at home, preparing drinks for people at 
the mosque. A group of men banged on her front door and 
insisted on entering even though she said her husband was 
not at home. The men who were armed with rifles barked: 
'Where is your husband, where are the weapons, where is 
your money?' Finding nothing, they pushed the woman into 
a room and raped her in tum, as she screamed for help. Her 
neighbours guessed what was going on but were too afraid 
to leave their homes and come to her assistance. The woman 
later said she could not be sure that the men were 
Indonesian soldiers, but she and her husband decided to 
leave the area for fear of being attacked again. [Waspada, 3 
January 2002] 
The other atrocity occurred in West Aceh, on 9 January 
2002. Four boys and men were sitting in a cafe in the village 
ofUjong Muloh, Jaya sub-district. At around 8pm, a group 
of soldiers from a nearby military command were out on 
patrol. As they drove past the cafe, they stopped and ordered 
the four to come out. After interrogating them for a few 
minutes, the soldiers opened fire and shot therr:i all dead. 
The victims have been named as: Muhammad bm Sakdan, 
18 years old, Budiman bin Umar, 35, Zubir bin Hasan, 14, 
and Sabirin bin Jalil, 20. [KAGEMPAR Banda Aceh, 
Students and Youth Coalition in West Aceh, 11 January 
2002] * 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
continued from page 28 
sory role . The main criticism has centred on the fact that the 
bill stipulates that the primary function of the police is to 
maintain security and order, while protecting and serving the 
public is placed within the context of that function. Critics 
insist ·that serving the public must be given pride of place. 
Imagine the consternation when it was suddenly announced 
early in December that the draft had been voted into law 
without giving anyone the chance to present their criticisms 
to legislators. A demand from several regions that regional 
police chiefs should be chosen locally, in the same way that 
the central parliament approves the appointment of the 
national police chief, was completely ignored. Nursyahbani 
Katjasungkana of the Women's Association for Justice 
complained bitterly that the bill contained no mention of 
women who are so often the victims of crime. Bambang 
Widjajanto, chair of the NGO Coalition, said the police bill 
could 'become an entry point to the new authoritarian 
system, as the president could freely utilise the police who 
are now armed with such a suppressive mechanism'. 
One member of the parliamentary commission in charge 
of deliberating the bill, a member of the PDI-P, gave a 
broad hint that money politics had played a part in securing 
the sudden enactment of the bill. [The Jakarta Post, 13 
December 2001] 
The only option now left to campaigners to undo the 
damage is to appeal to the president not to sign the bill into 
law. A signal step forward in the reform programme, sepa-
rating the police from the armed forces, has suffered a 
major setback and the police look set to continue to pursue 
a security role which places them on a par with the army.* 
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Militias convicted of crimes against humanity 
In an important decision in December 2001, an East Timor court convicted ten militiamen of 
crimes against humanity committed in East Timor during 1999. Their Indonesian commander 
escaped justice, as Jakarta refused to extradite him. Earlier, in the first case in which an 
Indonesian officer has been called to account for the atrocities committed in East Timor in 1999, 
a United States court awarded US$66 million against an officer responsible for systematic viola-
tions of human rights. 
Los Palos case 
On 11 December 2001, the Special Panel of the Dili 
District Court, which has jurisdiction over serious crimes, 
handed down its first convictions for crimes against human-
ity against ten members of Team Alpha militia based in the 
Los Palos area of eastern East Timor. 
The ten men were found guilty of involvement in a series 
of crimes between April and September 1999, including 
torture, murder, deportation of the civilian population and 
persecution. The court found that a widespread and 
systematic attack against the civilian population of East 
Timor had taken place in 1999 supported by the 
Indonesian authorities. The accused were aware that 
their actions were part of this attack and those actions, 
therefore, amounted to crimes against humanity. 
The victims included an independence supporter, 
Evaristo Lopes, who was tied up, kicked, beaten with 
an iron rod and stabbed to death at a base of the 
Indonesian special forces, Kopassus, on 21 April 
1999, and a group of nuns, clergy and an Indonesian 
journalist ambushed and executed whilst travelling 
from Los Palos to Baucau on 25 September 1999. 
The accused were sentenced to terms of imprison-
ment ranging from 4 years to 33 years 4 months, the 
maximum allowed under East Timorese law. 
Evidence was adduced that Team Alpha was created 
by Kopassus in the mid-1980s. At the times of the 
crimes Team Alpha operated out of the same building 
as Kopassus in Laruara, Los Palos. They shared logis-
tical support and were armed and trained by the 
Indonesian armed forces, TNI. According to the indict-
ment, the co-operation between the militia and the TNI 
included joint operations and attacks in which members of 
Team Alpha unlawfully arrested and abducted civilians who 
were subsequently taken to and interrogated by TNI, partic-
ularly by the locally-based 745 Battalion. 
Charges were also laid against Lt. Syaful Anwar, a local 
Kopassus commander, who, according to the indictment, 
had authority and control over members of Team Alpha and 
issued orders and instructions executed by the team. He 
allegedly supervised the abduction of Evaristo Lopes and 
slit his throat while he was being held down by two of the 
convicted militiamen. He is thought to be currently in 
Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities have refused to extra-
dite him despite an agreement between UNTAET and 
Indonesia which provides for the transfer of suspects 
between the two jurisdictions. 
The Special Panel comprised an East Timorese judge and 
two international judges, from Brazil and Burundi. 
No charges relating to the Los Palos atrocities have been 
laid against Indonesian officers higher up the chain of 
command. 
Other indictments for crimes against humanity have been 
issued, mainly against militia members, in relation to crimes 
committed in Bobonaro, Liquica, Same and Oecussi. These 
cases are awaiting trial or have been adjourned pending 
further hearings. 
[For comments on the performance of the Serious Crimes 
Unit ofUNTAET, which brought the Los Palos case to trial, 
see separate article 'Justice delayed yet again'] 
East Timorese militia 
Lumintang case 
So far, only one Indonesian officer has been held to 
account in a court oflaw for the atrocities committed in East 
Timor in 1999. In September 2001, the US District Court 
in Washington DC awarded damages of US$66 million in a 
civil claim against Major General Johny Lumintang for his 
involvement in the campaign of violence. At the time, 
Lumintang was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Indonesian 
army. 
In March 2000, East Timor activists in the US became 
aware that Lumintang would be visiting the US and 
instructed lawyers to prepare a claim against him alleging 
that, as a member of the Indonesian High Command, he 
designed, ordered, implemented and directed a program of 
systematic human rights violations in East Timor which 
resulted in the commission of crimes against humanity, 
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including torture, summary execution, assault, battery and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The main evidence of Lumintang's involvement in the East 
Timor atrocities - apart from the fact of his position in the 
Indonesian High Command - were a telegram which ordered 
local commanders to plan a crackdown should the East 
Timorese vote in favour of independence, and an army 
manual signed by him which stated that Kopassus officers 
were to be trained in propaganda, kidnapping, terror, agita-
tion, sabotage, infiltration, undercover operations, wiretap-
ping, photographic intelligence and psychological operations. 
The claim was brought by a mother whose son was killed, 
a man who was beaten and shot in the foot, which had to be 
amputated, and a man whose father was injured and brother 
killed. The plaintiffs also all had their properties destroyed 
or were forced from their homes in the aftermath of the 
August 1999 ballot. 
The main bases for the claim were two US statutes, known 
as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act. The ATCA allows non-citizens of the US to 
sue for acts, known as torts, committed outside the US in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the US provided 
the defendant is served notice of the suit in the US. The 
Torture Victim Protection Act re-affirms the ATCA and 
gives US courts jurisdiction over claims by non-citizens 
involving torture and extra-judicial killing. 
In the event, Lumintang failed to respond to the lawsuit, 
and judgement was entered against him. A trial was 
convened in his absence to hear evidence of the allegations 
against him. That evidence was accepted by the court as 
Lumintang presented no defence. 
In awarding damages to the plaintiffs, the court considered 
three main issues: the question of whether the court had 
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims, the question of 
Lumintang's liability and the question of damages. 
On the question of jurisdiction, the court decided that it 
had jurisdiction under the ATCA since the torts alleged in 
the case - torture, summary execution, crimes against 
humanity and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment -
were acts which violate international law or the law of 
nations and were therefore the kind of acts which are action-
able under the ATCA. 
The Torture Victim Protection Act was also quite clearly 
relevant since it provides a cause of action for torture or 
execution committed anywhere in the world. The Act does 
require that all local remedies must be exhausted, but the 
court found that seeking redress against Lumintang in East 
Timor or Indonesia would have been futile or inadequate so 
the need to exhaust local remedies was not required. 
On the question of Lumintang's liability, the court found 
that he was both directly liable and indirectly liable for the 
acts alleged by the plaintiffs. 
He was directly liable in that as the army's vice chief of 
staff, he - along with other high-ranking members of the 
Indonesian military - planned, ordered and instigated acts of 
terror and repression carried out by subordinates which led 
to the plaintiff's injuries. The evidence for this direct 
involvement was found in the telegram and army manual 
signed by him. · 
He was also indirectly liable under the principle of 
command responsibility, which is well established under US 
law for both crimes and civil wrongs. The court found that, 
as the army vice chief of staff and member of the TNI High 
Command, he ( 1) served as commander of subordinate 
members of the TNI in ET who perpetrated the acts of 
violence which injured the plaintiffs, (2) he kne~ ?r should 
have known that subordinates in ET were comm1ttmg, were 
about to commit or had committed widespread and system-
atic human rights violations, and (3) he failed to prevent or 
punish the violations. . . . . 
The court decided to award the plamt1ffs purnt1ve damages 
of $60 million as well as compensatory damages of $6 
million. This means that as well as being compensated for 
the mental and physical injuries they suffered, they were 
also awarded a large sum intended to pm1ish Lumintang for 
his actions. 
In awarding punitive damages, the court followed US legal 
authorities which said that punitive damages are an appro-
priate mechanism for upholding international norms against 
human rights abuses. The measure of punitive damages was 
determined by the nature and scope of the defendant's acts, 
his evil motive, and the need for deterrence. In particular 
his participation in a pattern of atrocities in East Timor 
throughout 1999 was taken into account. 
It is unlikely that the plaintiffs will ever recover the money 
they have been awarded, but Lumintang is now restricted in 
where he can travel abroad, and others may well be reluctant 
to travel to the US for fear of similar lawsuits. 
The Lumintang case follows many similar claims brought 
in the US under the ATCA. They included the 1994 case 
which resulted in an award of $10 million punitive damages 
and $4 million compensatory damages against Indonesian 
general Sintong Panjaitan for his involvement in the Nov. 12 
1991 Santa Cruz cemetery massacre of over 270 East 
Timorese. The plaintiff in that case was the mother of a 
19-year-old student who was among the victims. * 
continued from page 14 
saying that even this seems not able to truly reform itself. 
The unions vary greatly in quality. Growth is slow in a 
number of the unions; some are losing strength. Some, like 
the SPSI and SPSI-Reformasi unions, can claim large 
numbers, but their levels of activism are very low. They 
seem unwilling to take on the employers and government, or 
even the IMF. When the government announced that 20 
February would be 'Workers Day' as it is the anniversary of 
the birth of the SPSI, we hoped to join in a big alliance in 
protest. Obviously we want to celebrate International 
Workers Day on I May like elsewhere in the world. The 
'reformasi' unions said they would join in, but in the event 
mobilised no one to turn up. They only want to mobilise 
around economic issues, saying that other matters are 'not 
workers' issues'. So we regard them as having 'quantity' but 
not 'quality'. 
It is important for international supporters to take notice 
of these issues and make sure that internal reforms in the 
unions are being implemented. This is true not only at 
national level, but also at plant- and regional-level. There 
too we can still see the conservatism when it comes to deal-
ing with the companies, with the masses, and so on. It will 
take time for such organisations to break from the traditions 
of the past. Tµe leaders are so used to acting in undemoc-
ratic ways. This is why pressure from our type of organisa-
tion is useful. * 
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Justice delayed yet again 
The long delayed trials of crimes against humanity in East Timor have been delaye~ yet again 
. because of the foot-dragging by President Megawati. The investigations were completed m January 
2000 but nothing happened for fifteen months. After two presidential decisions .to .set up an ~d 
court, the date was set/or December, then postponed till 15 January. But Megawat1 did not appoint 
the judges till the day before the court was due to open, causing furth~r delay. In an! event, the 
highest-ranking officers original named are not on the list of suspects likely to face trial. 
The process almost descended to the level of farce 
when Chief Justice Bagir Manan announced that the ad 
hoc court for East Timor would be postponed from 
December 2001 because the authorities had failed to 
'foresee' the long holidays in December involving Idul 
Futri, Christmas and New Year. Megawati's delay in 
appointing the judges from a list of 30 nominated by the 
Supreme Court had everyone suspecting that the 
President was under pressure from the military. 
As Todung Mulya Lubis, one of Indonesia's leading 
human rights lawyers, has said: '(T)he Megawati govern-
ment cares more about its good relations with the mili-
tary and the police because it worries that bringing the 
human rights violators from the military and the police 
to justice will weaken the country. The Megawati 
government will have to pay very dearly for this erro-
neous political calculation and assessment.' [The 
Jakarta Post, 28 December 2001] 
Unsafe procedures . 
Indonesian NGOs have already complamed that the 
process by which the judges were nomin~ted was 
completely lacking in transparency. _Most of the J~dges are 
believed to have little understandmg or expenence of 
human rights. Their training is inadequate, ~argely ~ecause 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights w1th~rew 
her offer of training assistance after understandably object-
ing to the severe restrictions on the c~u~'s j~risdiction. 
(Megawati's decree setting up the court hm1ted its ~ork . t? 
crimes committed in April and September 1999 m D1h, 
Liquica and Suai). . 
There is no effective witness protection programme and 
no attempt has been made to addres~ the proble~ of the 
constitutional prohibition on retroactive prosecutions [see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 160, p. 16]. Indonesian human rights 
experts believe that if, as is likely, the non-ret~oactivity p~n­
ciple is used as a defence to crimes agamst humamo/ 
charges, the court will simply reduce the charges t? ordi-
nary crimes under the Indonesian Penal Code, rendenng the 
whole process meaningless. . . . 
No indictments have yet been issued, but 1t 1s known that 
the defendants will not include the former armed forces 
commander-in-chief, General Wiranto, and intelligence 
chief Lieutenant-General Zacky Anwar Makarim. Both 
were' named in the January 2000 report of the Indonesian 
Commission for Human Rights Violations in East Timor 
(KPP-HAM), which confirmed military invol~ement in and 
responsibility for crimes against humamty. Al?ert 
Hasibuan, the chair of the KPP-HAM, told a semmar 
Indonesian military increasingly calling the shots in Indonesia 
recently in Jakarta that the principle of command responsi-
bility is firmly established within the military. 'During the 
Second World War, General Yamashita was held responsible 
for the Pacific War. So my question is, why is Wiranto who 
was named as the man responsible in the KPP-HAM report 
not named as a suspect by the attorney-general?' 
Furthermore, the attorney general's office appears to have 
quietly dropped from its list of su~pects ~he milit.i~ ~eader, 
Eurico Guterres, head of the notonous Aitarak mihtla who 
is implicated in one of the worst atrocities, the attack .on t~~ 
home of independence leader, Manuel Carrascalao m D1h 
on 17 April 1999 when at least 12 people were killed. 
Guterres who was named in the KPP-HAM report, was for 
years a trusted member of Megawati's party, the PDI-P 
holding a post in its security department, and has recently 
placed himself at the head of the 'Anti-Communist League' 
in Jakarta. 
Political obstacles 
There are many political obstacles in the way of trials of 
high-ranking officers, related to the consolidation of the 
military's power since Megawati became president. 
Megawati's political dependence on the military has forced 
her into a delicate balancing act which involves her attempt-
ing to retain the support of the military while satisfying 
international demands for justice. She is also under pres-
sure to expedite the judicial process in order to clear the way 
for the resumption of military ties with the United States. 
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Under US law, full bilateral mi litary co-operation cannot be 
resumed until those responsible for the East Timor violence 
are held to account for their crimes [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 
163, p. 12]. 
Wiranto has added to the pressure on Megawati by embark-
ing on a cynical public relations campaign aimed at arousing 
sympathy for his men and accusing the criminal investiga-
tion of being biased because of its rel iance on fore ign 
sources, such as UNTAET and Australia, for its evidence. 
The outcome of Megawati's balancing act will not satisfy 
demands fo r justice. In order to protect those at the top who 
planned and directed the campaign of violence, she has 
apparently allowed a few selected senior-ranking officers, 
such as Adam Damiri, now a lieutenant-general , who 
headed the Bali-based Undayana military command over-
seeing East Tim or in 1999, to take the blame. Damiri was in 
operational control of the military in East Timor and to have 
excluded him would have made the whole exercise mean-
ingless. It remains to be seen how he will wriggle out of 
punishment. In any case, he is currently operations deputy 
chief of staff of the army and saving him will likely be a key 
part of the defence strategy. 
Defence lawyer makes his case 
The lawyer who has been appointed to head the defence 
team of the military who will face charges in the forthcom-
ing ad hoc trials is Adnan Buyung Nasution. Nasution made 
his reputation in the human rights community as the 
founder in 1980 of the country's first legal aid institute, the 
LBH in Jakarta. While no one will deny that all defendants 
are fully entitled to defence counsel, many eyebrows were 
raised when it was reported that such a renowned human 
rights lawyer would lend his name to defending the perpe-
trators of crimes against humanity. The military clearly took 
a strategic decision in appointing him. 
In a paper delivered to a seminar in Jakarta in January this 
year, Nasution warned that in the conduct of the forthcom-
ing trials, there would be three major impediments to secur-
ing a fair trial: 
Powerful psychological pressure from domestic public 
opinion which is already predisposed to believing that grave 
human rights abuses were committed. 
The danger that the judges will not have the courage to 
stand up to public opinion by passing verdicts that might be 
seen as unresponsive to the 'demand of the times' and will 
therefore 'compete with each other to become human rights 
heroes in the eyes of the public' . 
Psychological pressure from international public opinion 
which is firmly convinced that the Indonesian nation, 
specifically its government and security forces, are guilty of 
grave human rights abuses in East Timor. 
Under the pressure of such powerful public opinion, the 
trials will be 'very dramatic, while there is a minimum of 
material to provide lawful evidence'. [Paper delivered at a 
seminar organised by Solidamor, on the theme: 'Can the 
human rights trials satisfy our sense of justice?' Jakarta, 10 
January 2002] 
These comments suggest that the defence will argue that 
public opinion about the substance of the trials will render 
it impossible for the defendants to get a fair trial. This 
suggests a lack of faith in the capacity of the Indonesian 
judiciary to handle such trials. So, would an international 
tribunal be the preferred alternative? Not at all! Nasution 
argued that turning the cases over to an international 
tribunal would undermine the principle of the sovereignty 
of Indonesia's legal system and its 57 years of experience 
since independence. 
World community lacks commitment 
While the Los Palos and Lumintang cases reported else-
where in this Bulletin represent important developments in 
the search for justice for East Timor, they also .illustrat~ the 
ad hoc and unsatisfactory nature of the mternat10nal 
community's approach to this vital issue. It is clear that the 
international community does not have a coherent and cr~d­
ible strategy to ensure that those officers in the Indonesian 
military with the highest level of responsibility are brought 
to justice. Proceedings against the highest-ranking officers 
are vital to establish the truth of what happened, to help 
bring an end to impunity and to establish respect for the rule 
of law in Indonesia and East Timor. 
The UN's decision to give the Indonesian authorities the 
chance to bring the Indonesian perpetrators to justice is 
misguided and almost certainly doomed to failure. At the 
same time, its support for the serious crimes process in East 
Timor has been wholly inadequate. 
There have been persistent reports that the work of 
UNTAET's Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) has been severely 
hampered by problems relating to lack of resources, manage-
ment conflicts, poor communications, the lack of clear policy 
guidelines and a reluctance to expose the systematic nature 
of the 1999 atrocities. There have also been allegations of 
political interference in the judicial process and of deals 
being struck in talks with militia leaders at the border with 
West Timor. Several investigators and prosecutors have 
resigned after feeling frustrated with the SCU. 
The problems are now being addressed with a change of 
personnel, the appointment in August 2001 of a new deputy 
head of UNTAET, Dennis McNamara, whose mandate 
includes improving the performance of the SCU, and the 
recruitment of additional investigators and prosecutors. 
However, it will still be extremely difficult for the embry-
onic justice system of East Timar, which lacks experienced 
personnel and a fully-developed legal infrastructure, to 
bring the major perpetrators to justice. Lower-level militias 
will continue to be prosecuted and convicted, giving revi-
sionists the opportunity to assert that the blame for the 
violence lay primarily with the East Timorese themselves. 
Indonesia's refusal to comply with its obligations under a 
memorandum of understanding on legal co-operation 
signed with UNTAET in April 2000 and allow the ques-
tioning and transfer of suspects makes a difficult task 
almost impossible. 
It is worth repeating that crimes against humanity are 
crimes of universal jurisdiction and the international 
community has a special responsibility to ensure that the 
perpetrators are brought to justice. It has an additional 
moral responsibility in relation to the 1999 crimes in East 
Timar since many of them were committed while the United 
Nations was administering the 'popular consultation' or after 
it had abandoned the territory despite promises that it would 
remain after the vote. 
International solidarity campaign 
While the East Timar international solidarity movement 
and the broadly-based NGO community in East Timar 
continues to push hard for an international criminal tribunal 
as the most appropriate means of achieving justice, activists 
continued on page 21 
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Civilian rule, military power 
Speaking to an army parade in late December, President Megawati Sukarnoputri told the officers 
and men that it was their duty to do everything 'to hold the country together'. They should not hold 
· back out of a fear they might be violating human rights, as long as they acted 'within the law' and 
upheld the soldiers' oath, she said. c 
This extraordinary statement came at the end of a year in 
which the reform programme endorsed by all three presi-
dents who have been in office since President Suharto was 
forced from power in May 1998 has come to a halt. Four 
months earlier, in her state address on 16 August, she had 
struck a.different tone. On that occasion, she told the coun-
try's legislators: 'Whenever there is convincing evidence of 
severe violations of human rights outside the battlefield, 
those found guilty should be held responsible and legal 
action must be taken against them.' 
soldiers would be the ones who must face justice, should the 
case eventually come to court. This is what has made the 
spectre of 'violating human rights' a nightmare for the mili-
tary, those still on active service as well as those now 
retired. 
In the early post-Suharto period, two laws were enacted 
to provide the framework for these actions . The first was the 
Human Rights Law of 1999 which incorporated into law a 
whole range of violations and crimes against humanity that 
do not appear in Indonesia's penal code. The law also codi-
fied the practice and procedures of Komnas 
HAM, the National Human Rights Commission. 
The second was the Human Rights Court Law of 
2000, providing for the establishment of four 
permanent human rights courts and the creation 
of ad hoc courts to try crimes against humanity 
retroactively. 
Armed with these laws, Komnas HAM pressed 
ahead with the creation of several special investi-
gation commissions known by the initials KPP 
HAM. Behind the scenes there have been efforts 
by the military men in the firing line, especially 
high-ranking officers, to bribe the survivors and 
the families of the victims into agreeing to deals 
so as to avoid prosecution. This has been most 
successful with regard to the massacre of peas-
. . . . ants in Talangsari, Lampung, South Sumatra in 
Megawatt inspecting the troops during the parade 1989 h' h h d d th d f 
In a press release, TAPOL said that Megawati's carte 
blanche to the Indonesian military was 'an alarming setback 
for human rights in Indonesia. Megawati has shown an utter 
disregard for human rights principles which are integral to 
the building of democracy in Indonesia.' [Statement by 
TAPOL, 30 December 2001. 
Her words were directed particularly at troops who are on 
operations to quell the people of Aceh and Papua where 
alienation from Jakarta has deepened over the past year 
primarily because of the brutality they have experienced at 
the hands of Indonesian security forces and the failure of 
the government to punish past abusers of huma,n rights. 
'Suddenly we are aware of the need for a force to protect our 
... motherland from breaking up,' she said. 
Carte blanche for the military 
When Suharto fell from power, the military were weak and 
disoriented. They were suddenly confronted with a torrent 
of complaints about the human rights abuses that had been 
the hallmark of the previous regime. For the first time in 
decades, they were on the defensive because groups of 
victims came together to demand that the cases from which 
they had suffered be thoroughly investigated and the guilty 
men brought to account. In virtually every case, officers and 
, w ic appene un er e comman o 
Hendropriyono, who is now in charge of all the nation's 
intelligence agencies and has a seat in the cabinet 
A few days before President Megawati issued her carte 
blanche to the military, General Endriartono Sutarto, the 
army chief of staff, felt the need to admit that committing 
human rights abuses was 'still' a weak point for his men. 'I 
am aware there are one or two cases still occurring,' he said, 
but added that generals 'could not be held responsible for 
the mistakes of their troops'. Of course this is in contraven-
tion of one of the key principles of international human 
rights law, the principle of 'command responsibility'. 
Civilian rule, military power 
For a time during the first months of Wahid Abdurrahman's 
presidency, the military were faced with the threat of a 
major overhaul and scurried around to produce their own 
plans for a 'new paradigm' for reform, even hinting that they 
would cut back their territorial command structure under 
regional military commands known as Kodam. But gradu-
ally, the former president's reform measures came to a halt 
while the military succeeded in rallying their forces. In 
April last year, they used their muscle to force Wahid to 
issue Presidential Instruction IV/2000 for a so-called 
comprehensive solution to the crisis in Aceh. This amounted 
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to nothing less than the resumption at a more intensive level 
of military operations in Aceh which has led to a massive 
increase in the death toll and grave abuses in Aceh (see sepa-
rate article). This was a major turning point in the balance of 
power between the civilian-led government and the military, 
marking a significant political victory for the armed forces, 
the TNI. We had long predicted that the crisis in Aceh would 
lead to such a showdown. 
Two months later, Wahid was impeached and the army gave 
full , though largely behind-the-scenes, backing to Megawati 
who has never shown any inclination to stand up to the mili-
tary and roll back their power and influence. Being a dyed-in-
the-wool nationalist, dedicated at all costs to 'holding the 
country together', a view also held by Wahid (but without the 
tolerance of the Muslim leader), Megawati's prime concern is 
to destroy every 'separatist' movement that rears its head and 
she freely accepts the military's view that this can only be 
achieved through military operations. As the conflict intensi-
fies in Aceh and in Papua, following the assassination of 
Theys Hi yo Eluay, and communal or religious conflicts spread 
ominously to other parts of the archipelago, the military have 
come into their own again, gaining ground through deals and 
negotiations with the political parties. 
People often ask whether, as social and economic conditions 
in Indonesia continue to deteriorate, the military will try to 
seize power again. As things stand at present, they have no 
need to do such a thing. Under civilian rule, they have 
managed to secure for themselves a position of formidable 
power. They also know that military rule would provoke new 
political and economic problems for Indonesia internationally, 
and anyway, the country's economy is in such dire straits (see 
separate article) that they would be foolish to put themselves 
in a position where they would have to take responsibility for 
what may soon be a very grave crisis. 
What we have today in Indonesia is a situation in which mili-
tary power is cloaked by a civilian government. 
Weakness of civil society 
Only four years after the fall of the dictator Suharto, there 
has been a distinct weakening of civil society, particularly at 
the centre of government, in Jakarta. The stagnation of the 
reform programme has resulted from this decline. Most polit-
ical activity is being played out within parliament, the DPR, 
where rivalries between the parties is fierce and each one 
battles to win the favour of the military. Thus for instance, 
when the Bush administration launched its war in 
Afghanistan, anti-US street demonstrations were organised by 
fundamentalist Muslim groups with hardly any demonstra-
tions raising the anti-war banner. 
Towards the end of 2001, the human rights community in 
Jakarta came under threat with moves to undermine the lead-
ing legal aid institute, the YLBHI, forcing several of 
Indonesia's foremost human rights activists, including its 
chair and vice-chair, Bambang Widjojanto and Munir, to 
resign. A fierce battle also erupted within Kornnas HAM over 
the appointment of members who all came up for re-appoint-
ment in late 2001, at the end of their two-year term. The 
faction composed of retired military and bureaucrats is likely 
to outnumber the genuine human rights experts in the re-
constituted Commission. The conflict led to the bizarre situa-
tion in which the results of the Commission's investigations 
into an incident of police brutality in Abepura, Papua, was 
submitted to the attorney-general's office with two conflicting 
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recommendations: one confirming that the police had 
committed a crime against humanity and should go before 
the newly-established (but as yet never convened) human 
rights court, and the other insisting t~at it was just a .case of 
an 'ordinary crime'. Inevitably, this has undermme the 
public's confidence in the independence of Komnas HAM. 
Police Bill strongly criticised 
The decision two years ago to separate the police force 
from the armed forces was welcomed at the time as a big step 
forward, enabling the force to become a civilian-led force 
and discard decades of militaristic training and practices. 
In February 2001, the DPR began to discuss a draft Police 
Bill and soon found itself under pressure from many 
NGOs, calling for major amendments to the draft. An NGO 
Coalition on the Police Bill was formed and secured a 
promise from legislators in late October that enactment of 
the bill would be postponed to enable parliament to 
consider the many complaints about the bill. 
The criticisms relate in particular to the fact that the police 
force will be answerable only to the president, giving the 
force and the head of state unlimited powers and opening 
the possibility of the president using the police in 
pursuance of her/his interests, without any checks and 
balances. A National Police Commission is provided for to 
perform the role of watchdog but the members will be pres-
idential appointees and in any case, will only have an advi 
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